How Raymond Wong sees Tian'anmen Massacre Vigil in HK (2013)

How Raymond Wong sees Tian'anmen Massacre Vigil in HK

Translated by LegCo Translation and Interpretation Dept, spoken by Raymong Wong Yuk-man
Original: http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr12-13/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0529-translate-e.pdf 

(29 May 2013)

 Deputy President, commemoration of the 4 June incident has taken root on our land. 

 The motion on the 4 June incident is an annual expression of political stance. The pan-democrats perform the ritual every year, while the royalists dodge it year after year. It has already become a routine gesture and model response. However, such division has also led to a lazy mindset. Having considered themselves as the embodiment of justice for a long period, the pan-democrats have always marginalized internal disagreements. As the oppression of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) on the masses in Hong Kong becomes increasingly severe and internal disagreements become stronger, they have no idea how to respond except to demonize them. 

 The Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China (the Alliance) has almost monopolized the whole commemoration of the 4 June incident held in Hong Kong. The formulaic procedure of its vigil and the centralization of power inside the Alliance have already drawn criticisms from a lot of participants. Ten years ago, when I wished to go onto the stage in the vigil to appeal to the public to take to the streets to "topple TUNG" and oppose the introduction of legislation for Article 23 of the Basic Law, I had to beg sorely the seniors in the Alliance led by SZETO Wah and bargain with them repeatedly in order to get their "gracious approval". 

 Local consciousness has emerged since last year, and the Alliance drew up the puzzling slogan of "Love the country, love the people; Hong Kong spirit" which had evoked a tide of adverse comments. Then CHIN Wan posted an article on Facebook which says, "Commemoration of the 4 June incident must go into the community. The Alliance must draw a clear line between itself and the democratic camp. Otherwise, Hong Kong people should not participate in the vigil on 4 June". A stone tossed into the water has raised a thousand ripples. However, criticisms and responses have often been degenerated to giving vent to sentiments, and the obsolete moral judgment still applies, that is, "attendance in the candlelight vigil is a distinction between humans and beasts". 

 Today, we need to examine deeply into the issues of the commemoration of the 4 June incident. Since the airwaves era, I have strongly advocated abandoning the use of the word "vindication". Firstly, "vindication" implies recognition of the CCP's legal ruling status. Secondly, people with some knowledge of the CCP's history will understand that "vindication" and "reform of the political system" are not necessarily related. In 1978, DENG Xiaoping took advantage of the people's wish to vindicate the 5 April Tiananmen Incident to defeat the "yes-men", but after he had seized power, he turned his back and suppressed the Xidan Democracy Wall. There is the chance that such a historical event will recur in the future. 

 As for the new slogan of "Love the country, love the people; Hong Kong spirit", after the 1989 pro-democracy movement, there was a similar slogan in Hong Kong ― "If China has no democracy, Hong Kong will have no future" ― and after the 4 June incident, it became a defeatist statement which said, "If China has no democracy, Hong Kong will have no democracy either". During the pro-democracy movement, Hong Kong people had a rather complicated mental state …… right now we are discussing the motion on the vindication of the 4 June incident. The Honourable colleagues in the pan-democratic camp should find it very serious, but I do not know what Dr Helena WONG is laughing at. What are you laughing at? Is it very funny? We are discussing the vindication of the 4 June incident here. What are you laughing at? 

(...)

 Let me borrow HUNG Ho-fung's words on Facebook: "4 June 1989 was an important landmark in the establishment of Hong Kong people's subject identity, though it concurrently had the contradictory effects of stimulating Hong Kong's subject consciousness (that means disillusion with the "liberal CCP") and suppressing such subject consciousness (that means tying up democratization in Hong Kong with democratization on the Mainland)." On the other hand, for many Hong Kong people, that was the point of awakening their sense of identity as "Chinese people". 

 However, after the 4 June tragedy, it became an endless misery of "unrequited love". Looking back 24 years later, the 4 June tragedy marked the CCP's failure to grasp the last golden opportunity to mend its way. The so-called "reform within the CCP system" is just a fantasy. In addition, since DENG Xiaoping's inspection in the south in 1992, the whole country only has eyes on money. Corruption is entirely out of control, and the quality of the masses on the Mainland is as low as it can get. Judging from this, even the "civilized China" is gradually dying out in the north of the Shenzhen River. The CCP continues to occupy China by foul means. Competing with a political regime which has monopolized "love for the country" by showing "we love the country more", and cherishing unrequited love for a country which does not deserve our love, will be futile. 

 Every year I will attend the candlelight vigil for only two reasons: first, all beings grieve for their fellows' misfortunes; second, I wish to denounce the "butcher" regime through attending the vigil, in the hope that Hong Kong people will not forget the definite relationship between the 4 June tragedy and the "butcher" regime. 

 Now some people have queried whether the number of people attending the candlelight vigil would actually scare the Community Party, I think they have really set the focus wrong. If the Alliance is willing to make the memorial activities completely local and leave out the theme about love for the country, the Community Party will be more scared. However, requesting them to mend their way, I am afraid, is like expecting the Democratic Party to apologize to the public for betraying the voters three years ago, on which no high hopes can be placed. I hope that people who decide to boycott the candlelight vigil of the Alliance can organize activities on their own to commemorate the 4 June incident with local perspectives. They should not boycott the so-called "memorial activities". 

 The civic society in Hong Kong is a forgotten "casualty". The 1989 pro-democracy movement had awakened the idealistic sentiment of many Hong Kong people, but the following suppression had shattered their ideals and made most Hong Kong people more cynical. Owing to the time constraint, I cannot finish delivering this speech. 

 The 4 June tragedy is a humanitarian disaster. By the standard of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, it is a "crime against humanity". From this angle, we demand the Communist Party to take responsibility. 

Maron: HKers Are Not Morally Obliged to Save Depraved Chinamen

Hongkongers Are Not Morally Obliged to Save Depraved Chinamen

Translated by Chen-t'ang 鎮棠, Edited by Karen L., Written by Maron (瑪倫)
Original: http://www.passiontimes.hk/article/03-15-2015/21757/ 

Gary Fan, Claudia Mo, Ray Chan, "Fast Beat", "Long Hair", James Hon, Raphael Wong Ho-ming.....these names were widely acclaimed a few months or few years ago, among all obfuscating pan-democrats. These self-dubbed "progressists" had perplexed some politically naive Hongkongers as if they can truly help.

These days, citizens have witnessed the pan-dems becoming "pan-fried democrooks" and have seen the mounting localist protests against parallel traders. Even though the restoration movement might not be as successful as expected, the localists have gained the public an upper hand of this battle, whereas these self-claimed "progressive" pan-dems took the credit of the favourable results and left the blames to localists.

What is behind localists' success? It is that the localists all know a cruel fact - "politics is showbiz for ugliness". Instead of getting "halo" or claiming credits, localists are pragmatic and emphasise efficiency - even at the expense of adopting extreme means. For the "Restoring Tuen Mun" social movement, the mainstream media have condemned the localists as severe as possible. But we localists are not going down because of it as we do know one thing - nothing is ever done by the pan-dems because they love sitting on the moral high ground and dodge immediately if being criticised. If it is useful in talking the talk, the valorous localists will never have to walk the walk!

Out of fear, the pan-dems have been avoiding conflicts. Take Umbrella Revolution as an example. Admiralty and Mong Kok are utterly two different worlds back then. Pan-dems were calling the shot in the Admiralty "Big Stage". Can weak flowers living in the greenhouse really be compared to the daredevils in Mong Kok? Leung Kwok-hung "Long Hair", a self-claimed revolutionist, has shown his true colours - a coward - since the valorous confrontational tactics derived in Mong Kok.

What Leung uses to do - hurling bananas or sending coffins to officials - is performance art after all, without a slight of influence. The conflicts between the pan-dems and the localists these days are exactly the continuation of the differences between Admiralty and Mong Kok.

I am a localist, and localists can be unscrupulous - I'm not ashamed to admit it. Why not indulging in the "love and peace" crap as the pan-dems do? Let's see what the Occupy Central movement ended up. Nosediving popularity in the end. And then what? There has been seen no coming back. Talking Chinamen into love and peace is merely casting pearls before swine given that it is their nature to bully the weak, fear the strong and nothing else. They will come after you once you show weakness in front of them.

Do remember what Lu Xun says, "We shall not be afraid of speculating Chinese people with the most malicious intent". Chinamen are not entitled to blame Hongkongers for being ruthless since they never deserve otherwise.

Some leftards might believe, "When you oppose devils, you become one of them." For the record, with the mission to protect our civilised city, we choose to treat Chinamen like barbarians - Barbarians will only be taken aback by acts of their kind. 

Localists dare to deal with Chinamen because there's no mind-shackles towards the suggestions by some "Greater China" faction, which are thoughts such as "the institution is the culprit" and "the party and the country are two separable concepts" so as to harbour their own kind. Leopard cannot change its spots. Even with a different regime, Chinamen are Chinamen.

Imagine the "the party and the country are two separable concepts" discourse stands. It would not be a problem if Japan does not apologise for what they have done in WWII. By this very logic, the Imperial Rule Assistance Association would have nothing to do with Japanese. Therefore there would be no need for today's Japanese to bear the responsibility back then. This logic itself proves what the kind of people Chinamen are. I wouldn't mind if Chinamen mutilate themselves with such retarded thought. But letting them to rule over Hong Kong? The answer is "No", a certain "No".

Democracy and China combined is the best example of Stockholm syndrome. If ever there is some so-called democratic China, it will not change the fact that Chinamen are born colonisers.

Let me ask you a question. If your neighbours have some family disputes, will you intervene between them? Lines are clearly drawn, so "No". Similarly, Hongkongers are not morally obliged to save depraved Chinamen. And the localists are going to kick them out of our home - by all means necessary - before it is too late.

Wing Wing: Abuser of Power Got Abused

Abuser of Power Got Abused

Translated by NA, J. Wong, Vivian L., Edited by Vivian L., Written by 翼雙飛 (Wing Wing)
Original: http://www.passiontimes.hk/article/09-29-2014/19033

(Photo credit: Passiontimes)

Under British rule, one of the greatest benefits Hong Kong had gained is the culture of working in accordance with rules and regulations. The British understood that men are weak and selfish in nature. Once they are empowered with authorities without restriction by rules, they will corrupt. It is impractical to expect men to exercise restraint and act on conscience and moral conduct without a comprehensive system for regulations. Readers can look no farther than China, a country with practically no working social system to restrict its people. The Chinese corrupt, abuse power and walk in by the back door. Had Hong Kong not been a British colony, our society might just suffer a similar fate.

To ensure police can execute their duties, policemen are authorised with more power than ordinary citizens. For one thing, they have the authority to check the identities of passers-by.  To avoid abuse of power abuse, the discipline and behaviour of policemen both on- and off-duty are monitored by the Law of Hong Kong and the Police General Orders set up by the Hong Kong Police Force. Offenders are liable to disciplinary actions.

As far as the legal regulations on the use of police power and on the execution of police duties are strictly followed, not only could police officers protect themselves amidst turmoil in the political environment, no one could question their authority. 否則，警隊就會把自己置於危牆之下。

According to information circling around the internet, "The Use of Force" stipulated under Chapter 29 of Police General Orders (PGOs)According to information circling around the internet, "The Use of Force" stipulated under Chapter 29 of Police General Orders (PGOs) [Translator's note: Some PGOs are inaccessible to the public, Chapter 29 is one of them] are as follows:

1. Police officers (POs) should exercise self-discipline and restraint when in contact with citizens.  Force should not be used unless there is an absolute need or when there is no any other alternative to complete the task legally.

2. Before using any force, a PO shall make clear to the subject of said force his identity and, whenever the circumstances allow, give a warning, and indicate the kind and level of force to be used.  Within the scope of practicality, it should be made possible for the subject to comply with the order of the police before any force is used.

3. The use of force must not be more than what is necessary for its aim(s); such force must no longer be used after achieving the aim(s); any force used must be reasonable in the circumstances.

Footages on the internet and the news show numerous occasions where police used force against protesters. Viewers will also take note of the types and uses of weapons employed by the police (batons, shields, pepper spray and tear gas), and decide for themselves whether or not such "force" is in accordance with Chapter 29 of the PGO above.

In light of loud outcries from the public condemning police brutality, Executive Councillor Fanny Law went with the flow and pointed her finger at the police. "The way the officers have dealt with the situation is the source of public anger. The police owe an explanation to the Executive Council," Law said in a radio interview, effectively clearing the government of any responsibility.

Speaking on behalf of the police, Assistant Commissioner of Police (Operations) Cheung Tak-keung denied responsibility on the part of the government and the senior officials. Cheung stressed to reporters that under any circumstances, use of force by the police is on direct orders of the commanding officers at the scene. I wonder what those officers say to that. I wonder if they will be able to quote a relevant law for every single order they have ever given to excuse themselves from responsibility.

A famous Chinese proverb goes like this, "When the crafty hares are exterminated, the hunting dogs will be cooked; When the partridges are gone, the fine bows will be put away."  In the bid to hunt down the crafty hares in the protesters, the police are at the disposal of Leung's government as hunting dogs. Now that the crafty hares are still out and about, isn't it a bit soon to dispose of the loyal hunting dogs?

[Undergrad/HKUSU] China is Nobody's Master: Ming Chan

China is Nobody's Master

Translated by Vivian L., Written by 陳雅明 (Ming Chan)
Original: http://www.vjmedia.com.hk/articles/2014/09/17/85319

“Don't despair,
not even over the fact that you don't despair.
Just when everything seems over with, new forces come marching up,
and precisely that means that you are alive.”

— Franz Kafka, Diaries of Franz Kafka

On the last day of August 2014, we were all jolted awake from a daze of stress and anxiety. Life was as usual, but a shadow loomed large in the sky. On a closer look, people had turned into hideously large bugs. Distraught with despair, they hid in the shadows waiting for life to trickle away. Such is the despair I had felt on that day, not unlike the imagery in Franz Kafka's The Metamorphosis.

This is an era of hope and of despair. So much is about to happen, a historic revolution is upon us—yet nothing is going to happen, or so it seems. We had hoped that one day, we would wake up to a different Hong Kong where we could enjoy real freedom; we had hoped that one day, we would gather in the Civic Square [Translator's note: The area in front of the Central Government Offices was dubbed “civic square” by student activists after the national education protest in 2012. The government calls it the Forecourt of East Wing.] to celebrate the triumph of democracy; we had hoped that we Hongkongers could decide our own fate. Yet the world does not go without a fair share of absurdity—in a world dictated by an oppressive regime, no less. Any effort to resist oppression would be rendered minute and inconsequential. The clear-headed knows what needs to be done but having their hands tightly tied, they swallow their pride. The indifferent continues life in blissful ignorance, albeit only deceptively, existing rather than living. In a world such as this, how may Hongkongers imagine a future for themselves?

It would seem the chronicles of Hong Kong is nearing its end. Will Hong Kong's narrative, which started as a small village in 1842, end in 2047 when China's promise of “one country, two systems” ceases?  From a small fishing village to an international metropolis, Hong Kong has been proven an extraordinary example of a modern society. Will our generation see Hong Kong stoops to an ordinary city of the People's Republic? Will the Pearl of the Orient turn to dust in our hands? After WWII, the surge of immigrants who took refuge in Hong Kong's safety and stability had given the city an abundant supply of new blood. Born and raised in Hong Kong, they were the first generation of Hong Kong natives who planted their roots here and called the city their only home—a home that they strived to change for the better. Since the 1970s, the younger generation of Hongkongers had ditched the refugee mentality of their parents' generation. They began thinking about Hong Kong's future: they participated in social movement and demanded political reforms under colonial rule while Hong Kong as a civil society began to take shape. From 1980 onwards, democracy became a common cause for Hongkongers both young and old.

However, as talks of Hong Kong's future ensued between Britain and China, 1980s was also a time when many in the pro-democracy camp misled Hong Kong into the path of “democratic return of sovereignty” where the fate of Hong Kong was believed to be in lockstep with that of China—no democracy for Hong Kong without a democratic China. Blinded by the unification of Greater China ideology, they mistrusted Beijing and hailed the “one country, two systems” policy as the utopian ideal for a self-ruling Hong Kong, only to have 30 years wasted on a fruitless journey. When Beijing blew the introduction of direct elections in the 1988 Legislative Council election, leaders of the democratic movement should have known democratisation did not sit well with the Chinese government. When the tragedy struck at Tiananmen Square in 1989, they, of all people, should have realised such a brutal regime that had the blood of innocent students' on its hands was not to be trusted. In dire circumstances, one may find it plausible to trust a woman of the street. Yet in absolutely no circumstances should one put his trust in the Chinese communists. After all this time, some who used to promote the democratic return ideology now accused Beijing of ditching democratisation promise. It is but a futile effort. A look at the Chinese communist party history would tell anyone that the jockey for power among party leaders almost always comes in the expense of ordinary people. Those who were naive enough to advocate a democratic return were but obliging pawns in China's connivance.

If the democratic return advocates have a change of heart now, they are either incredibly stupid or incredibly good at self-deception. In fact, it is not 'stupid' that can describe their bewildering action. They are simply contented with limited democratisation within the current systems where they now benefit. Their passion for a democratic Hong Kong was quenched by the paltry concession they have gained over the years of fighting for democracy they no longer believe in. Now that China has irrevocably ruled out a true democracy, Hongkongers must wipe away our despair with utmost clarity: democratic return is no longer an option; we must declare its utter failure and reject the notion altogether. The majority of the young proponents of democratic return idea back then have become veterans of the pan-democratic camp now. Although we have little hope of these old-timers having the ambitions they once had, we wish they could do as Confucius had taught, “In his old age, ... he should abstain from acquisitiveness”. Precious time has been wasted on the democratic return bull-crap. If politicians cave in to “acquisitiveness” and allow the phoney universal suffrage proposal to be passed for whatever interests in exchange, history will remember them as the culprits who ruined Hong Kong's democratic process. When the election plan tailored to Beijing's taste get vetoed, Hongkongers would be happy to see them pack up all their democratic return nonsense and make way for newcomers. Their times have passed. So long and good riddance!

Right now, we need to fend off all passive pessimism and blind optimism. We need to assess the current situation and review our history. Nobel laureate Albert Camus said in his Nobel prize in Literature 1957 Banquet Speech, “Each generation doubtless feels called upon to reform the world. Mine knows that it will not reform it, but its task is perhaps even greater. It consists in preventing the world from destroying itself.”

We need not follow the footsteps of our previous generation on our road to a democratic Hong Kong. Rather, it is our tasks to seek a new way and shoulder new responsibilities. No one knows whether the history of Hong Kong will end in the year 2047, but the duty to prevent our beloved city from destruction lies in our generation. Democracy is more than the pursuit of universal values, or an extra line of protection. The quest for democracy matters to the lives and future of generations of Hongkongers to come.

In 1982, China announced it will take back the sovereignty of Hong Kong in 1997. At the time, Hongkongers overwhelmingly opposed to the handover. But then Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping cooked up an alternative reality where the people of Hong Kong desired unification with China. China also objected Britain's idea of Hong Kong as a “three-legged stool” and the proposal to include the people of Hong Kong in deciding its future, demeaning Hongkongers at every turn. 1984, the year of the signing of the unequal treaty Sino-British Joint Declaration, is arguably the most disgracing year in the history of Hong Kong. 2014, 30 years after the joint declaration, Beijing is attempting to demean Hongkongers one more time by forcing a phony universal suffrage proposal upon us. For 30 years, Hongkongers have suffered enough absurdity and humiliation from Beijing. From this day on, Hongkongers shall stand to defend themselves. Even we may not get back the democracy and freedom we so well deserve, we must rise and fend for our dignity. We must reject this Beijing scheme to control our future. Any legislator who gives the green light to Beijing's proposal is an enemy of Hong Kong. They will be condemned for years to come.

Some in the pro-establishment camp argued that Beijing's decision is final and irreversible, and for the sake of the whole society, we should accept the proposal. These people have been far too comfortable being flunkies of Beijing for too long. Beijing is a god to them. Beijing's decision is the truth above all else.

The same goes for the advocates of democratic return and the occupy Central leaders. All of their assertions have been made on the premise that Beijing's authority is not to be challenged. No wonder democratic movement has long been plagued with persistent irresolution and aimless manoeuvring, which would only result in, at last, the whole campaign going to ruin.

Compared to Beijing's denial of a free election, we are more disappointed with the occupy Central movement headed by Benny Tai and Co.  We are not disappointed with Beijing's ruling because we never held expectation. But with the occupiers, we are fraught with disappointment because we have had high hopes for the occupy movement.

Only days after China decided to curb free elections in Hong Kong's next leadership election, Benny Tai has backed down from his enthusiasm in the civil disobedience movement. Conceding failure before even trying to fight, Tai declared in an interview that the occupy movement would be unable to alter political reality.

The demise of the occupy movement may have dashed our hopes and exacerbate the grim outlook ahead of us, but it accentuated that any future rebellion adopting the occupiers' kind of “peacefulness” will be in vain. It also showed us how the democratic return proponents, Occupy Central trio all fall to their knees before Beijing — just as the pro-Beijing flunkies do — like a slave worships his master. It is ludicrous how one can claim to be pro-democracy on one hand and practises slavery on the other. It is like having a person who has no personal integrity nor the ability to determine what's best for himself and others clamouring for democracy. It's just wrong. China seems overbearing and formidable, not because it is a nation of stature, but because many have “fallen to their knees”.

Now, the democratic movement in Hong Kong lacks focus as the occupy campaign withers away and successors have yet to gather momentum.  Right now, Hong Kong needs a new direction. The democratic return ideology ought to make way for the “Hong Kong democratic independence” movement. It is a concoction of Hongkongers' longing for democracy and the demand for independence. During their fight for democracy through the years, the democratic return advocates rarely had a vision for an independent Hong Kong. They had pushed for decolonisation but never independence. Instead, they had relied on a totalitarian regime that is China to realise its promise to give Hong Kong democracy. This is downright absurdity. It is an absurdity called “one country, two systems”. The “Hong Kong democratic independence” movement declares that China is no master of Hong Kong. Hong Kong deserves the right to determine its own fate. In the face of absurdity, we choose not flight nor surrender. Camus believed that continuing to resist absurdity for as long as one shall live is the only way to freedom.

There was once a story that goes like this:

A primary one student asks his grandfather, “The teacher handed us each a red scarf to wear today. She said the red scarves were made of blood. She told us to cherish it. But why does it only cost 50 cents to buy one in the store?” His grandfather answers, “Your teacher said so because the Party had said so. You say such things to survive. But no matter, in a month, you and your parents will move to Hong Kong and then you will be free.”

1949 marked the point when Hong Kong and China went separate ways. During the Cold War, it was for freedom that countless Germans from East Germany risked their lives to climb over the Berlin Wall into West Berlin. It has been for freedom that Chinese from north of the border have crossed Shenzhen River into Hong Kong. Here, we refuse lies and speak the truth. Here, we can live with dignity. Now, our city has come to a pivotal moment. We cannot let our home go to pot. If we fail now, we fail the future—the future that belongs to the children of our time.

At the end of Kafka's Metamorphosis, Gregor, the protagonist who has transformed into a large bug, dies. Despite his condition and the great despair it brings him, Gregor has struggled to live as he finds solace in his family. But eventually, his family grows so disgusted of him that they abandon him. His sister ends up resenting her brother and calls him a monster. Gregor has died of abandonment. Hong Kong may be more like Gregor than any one of us.

Ming Chan

Assistant Editor-in-chief, Undergrad, HKUSU

Law: Impossible for China to Have a Democratic Regime

Impossible for China to Have a Democratic Regime

Translated by Chen-t'ang 鎮棠, Edited by Karen L., Written by 羅沛霖 (Law Pui-lam)
Original: http://www.passiontimes.hk/article/09-10-2014/18765 

(Photo: Naixi Village in Beijing, which sounds the same in Cantonese as "Cunnilingus Village")
(Photo source: www.bjnxc.cn )

For decades, the "democratic-reunificationists" in Hong Kong have been chanting slogan in a futile manner, and never did it delve into the democratic development in China. The society of China simply cannot foster a democratic regime, of which this judgement is based on an investigation into a village election in China.

In 1999, the very first round of election among villages was held in the Guangdong province. By "one person, one vote", the committee was elected to take responsibility of managing the social and economic affairs for the village. Besides the right to vote, villagers can be elected as well. It was clearly stated that even if villagers are not nominated by the Villagers Nomination Committee as candidates, they will not be excluded the right to participate in the election, whereas the Branch Party Secretary and other posts were assigned directly by the Communist Party as usual. As for the village of my study object, it was a "trial spot", where the village election was carried one year before 1999.

In that village, all kinds of matters (e.g. selling lands, building factories, introducing FDI, building roads, executing policies from the central authorities) were controlled by the Party members originally, especially the Branch Party Secretary, who had hence brought a great deal of fortune within his family. Some villagers told me his "visible assets" (properties and flats) by the time were worth approximately 500 million RMB (1998, ~60 million USD). 

It was learnt that the secretary wanted to grasp the social and economic resources, so he decided to take part in that election. Yet many villagers, if not all, regarded this election as a hopeful one to elect a committee chairman against the secretary and for the reallocation of resources.

There's no reasons for me even back then not understanding what the function of election to CCP: a means to pacify the conflicts in the rural society brought by Reform and Opening Up. Yet I did see it as a precious chance to let the mainland society get onto the path towards democracy, however, it remains an unreasonable dream after all.

In the beginning there were villagers studying the regulation of election, attempting to figure out the methods to ensure nomination of their preferable candidates and ways of canvassing, even the preparation avoiding interference during the election processes. All of these made me feel that the crux of a democratic election is well-known in a village where such election never exist. I thought it was brought by the power of a free market, and I believed in the logic "economic reform will bring about changes in society, culture and politics" on China. But when I tried to understand more in their views, what I found happened to be another story and logic.

"When election takes place, we must vote for the members of our own clan (family members within some generations) regardless of their capabilities. Eventually, he is from our clan! He will surely help if anything happens to our family." This is what a young villager told me -- well, in fact, all villagers believed in such logic. It never comes to the villagers to elect someone with competency, because this one with ability, in their minds, will only make benefit within one's own clan and no advantages will be there for other villagers - just like the Branch Party Secretary and his clan.

Clans were there in villages rather than societies!

I later found out that "clan" relationship has been the deepest interpersonal relationship in mainland China. Since the CCP has taken over it, they changed the game rule of resource allocation: focus shifted from economic resources to political ones. The riches were lambasted with their properties and land confiscated. Politically they became the rags. This is not a sole change of personal status, but involved the entire family, or some referred it as clan. Let me put it this way, landlords and rich peasants or the elites in the past can only marry those with the same "political status". Clan, as it always do. It's just a matter of forms.

The game rule of CCP is merely reshuffling the social status of clans. A series of anti-feudalism political campaigns (from Land Reform to People's Commune to Cultural Revolution) were just suppressing the tradition, but not successful in faltering the traditional clansmen-ship. On the contrary, the rule of CCP is just a continuation of such "deep interpersonal relationship" which has last for thousands of years.

The election that year clearly showed the role of such traditional clansmen-ship. The secretary and another candidate made full use of their families to canvass. It is simple enough - if they can get the nod from the elders in the clan, they can get support from almost all of that clan. The secretary used his money and authority to benefit a few big clan, which enables himself of making much more supporters than the other candidates. That's why he won, not surprisingly, and became the chief of the Village Committee. Besides his political authorities, he kept on controlling the economic and social development of the village.

The secretary had gained himself with quite some numbers of "haters" before the election, but eventually these people still voted for him! I interviewed a few who once criticised him being greasy in terms of money and authority. But many of those had the same reason – the "satiated tiger, hungry wolf" theory.

The logic of clansmen culture made them feel that no matter who becomes the chairman of the committee, he will only look after his own clan without paying attention to the livelihood of the rest as a whole. This haven't even entered the core thought of them. Deep inside they possessed a thinking that for the other candidates who have not been controlling the resources will be like "hungry wolves" if elected, becoming more corrupted than those "satiated tigers". And to vote for a "hungry wolf" without any relationship with one's own clan, one will be more likely to suffer.

This "tiger-or-wolf" logic concludes the village-level politics in China.

More than 70 years earlier, such situation was already analysed by a famous Chinese anthropologist Fei Xiaotong. He pointed out that in the West, a person can have different identities at the same time – a scout member, a Methodist follower, a member of a party, a father in a family and etc. But in Chinese villages, people have one and only one identity – a part of the clan. In decades, the framework of rural interpersonal network has remained dominant.

A few years ago, I went back to that village again and saw how the following elections proceed – it's pretty much the same.

Rural politics can be seen as the epitome of the politics of China. In Chinese society, you'll not find possible to "detach" the identity of a part of a certain clan. When it comes to Buddhist temples, schools, colleges, relationship and seniority, "clan" is always included, let alone the CCP or PLA. There is no more existence of "friendships" in mainland China. They're replaced by calling each other "xiongdi" (brothers), or else they are not in the same clan. In other words, if two are real friends, then the "friendship" must be turned into "clansmen-ship", like that they're from the same family.

Wang Mingming, another anthropologist in China, belongs to Fei Xiaotong's clan. Although he was found plagiarism for tens of thousands of words in his publication, Fei's clan saved him by every means from being fired by the university. In the Chinese academia, such "clan-like" interpersonal relationship is just about guanxi, but not rights and wrongs, not to mention academic credibility.

The deplorable nature exists in Chinese academia, and no doubt there is even a higher degree of it in the party inside. How can it not make sense for commoners to understand Xi's anti-corruption acts as starting a turf war with "tiger-or-wolf" logic? It has already been told, by nature, that never has such moves been relevant to some sort of social justice. 

With the despotic one-and-only presence of "clan-like" relationship, mainland China can only be far from the civil-minded society where people dare to distinguish rights and wrongs regardless of getting into deadly accusations. Democratic regime for China stays, if no significant changes, impossible.