Nicole Wong: The False Song of Chinese Nationalism

The False Song of Chinese Nationalism

Written by Nicole Wong; originally on Comitium Volume 3 (publication of Hong Kong National Party)
Originally from issuu

Tanni / EJInsight

When Hongkongers first realised that their fate currently lies in the hands of the foreigner, when the first call for Hong Kong Independence was voiced, and when the Hong Kong National Party was first convened, the resounding rebuttal was that of a familiar question: “Are you not a Chinese as well?”  All too familiar indeed is the question, for not only is its contents a cliché, but its accompanying features: the moralising and patronising tone, the aged and wrinkled face, and the underlying sincere belief from the accuser that all parties engaging in the heated debate are, beyond any doubt, Chinese.  The PRC members are Chinese, the Hongkongers are Chinese; the pro-Establishments are Chinese, the pro-Independents are Chinese; you are Chinese, I am Chinese, we are all Chinese.  It is as if the fabled Golden Headband of Journey to the West's Monkey King has come to life, and with the familiar words, the inescapable Chinese identity binds us all to our predestined obedience to our Chinese colonial masters, who are, as we are reminded by this very instant, our beloved brothers in the Sinic brotherhood.

Thus smugly does the self-assured Sinic accuser disarm, without any self-awareness of Stockholm Syndrome, any threats to the imposed Chinese identity.  Those politically engaged amongst you might have noticed that this “call to linked arms” is no novel rhetoric.  Indeed, long since before the sovereignty of Hong Kong was handed from the Brits to the Chinese in 1997, whenever the separate identity of Hongkongers was ever raised, there came inevitably the self-assured, “patriotic” rebuttal: “Are you not Chinese?” And how effective it was in shutting down all discussions!  In an age where both the pro-Beijing and the pan-democrats believe they are merely squabbling brothers born of the same beanstalk [Though it must be said the illusion runs far deeper for the latter.], it is easy to see why the curse is so effective --- to claim you are somehow a different national identity from those with which you share the same nationality is a patently absurd idea.  It is not until very recently when Hongkongers realised that it is the premise of this curse that is the absurd detail: the age-old lie that Hongkongers are “Chinese”, for the specific definition of “Chinese” that this curse implies.  The opposition stops here, though, and most “localists” are content with substituting it with a murky self-identification of “Hongkonger”, after which we observe a mess of competing bikeshedding: whether “Hongkonger” is an ethnic-national identity, civic-national one, or both; when the “historical immigration cut-off” line should be drawn for “Hongkongers” to be considered natives; and so on.  None has recognised and attempted to lob off the chief supporting leg of the argument on the other side: the curse of “Are you not a Chinese?” is allowed to flourish even to this day, because the Hong Kong public still implicitly believes in, in one way or another, the false song of Chinese nationalism.

The “Chinese”: a national identity built on self-defeating ideas

There are many ways to dismantle the lie of Chinese nationalism.  One could observe how it is no more than a continuation of an imperial subject identity, given a modernist and fashionable name when the ROC and then the PRC adopted the idea from Europe.  This particular thrust has been explored by past publications on Comitium by analysing the intentionally woolly definition of the word “Chinese” written in the Chinese script.

The very same word could mean,

1, the pseudo-biological ethnicity of Han Chinese;
2, the legal nationality of a PRC national;
3, the cultural identity of a Chinese transcending legal nationality; and
4, the romantic idea of a single cultural tradition, presumably unbroken for millennia, found in the East Asian territories that are within today's PRC borders. 

The absurdly wide range of definitions contained within this single word has given rise to such claims from a certain Member of the National People's Congress, Michael Tien Puk-sun's mouth, “Just look at our skin [colour], if we weren't Chinese I don't know what we are” (definition by biology) to be followed by “the Chinese nation has its history spanning millennia.  Now I don't know if you've read any history,” (definition by romantic tradition) “but this whole thing is as simple as stating 'my mother is a woman'!” (definition by popular consensus) “When you go travelling, you fill in the nationality field with 'China' and not 'Hong Kong'” (definition by legal nationality).  At no point does the nebula of definitions attempt to be consistent with itself, with different facets thereof carted out when the situation calls for it --- its principal aim is to remind the audience that they are Chinese.  The Chinese nationalist-reminder thus selects its victims with utmost abandon, for anyone with the most tenuous claim to “Chinese”-ness, perhaps by some distant grand-grand-grand uncle who lived in a conquered province under the (Mongolian-ruled) Qing Dynasty, could still be lassoed in to become just as “Chinese” as the bloodline heir to Old Confucius by the interwoven mess that is “Chinese national identity”.  And once that association is mentioned, the Chinese nationalist-reminder grows full-blown into the Chinese nationalist-curse, for it is within that narrative that any such identified “Chinese” are duty-bound to follow the leadership of the current “Chinese” regime, i.e. the PRC.  That these wildly varying and at times self-conflicting definitions could be played out at will to form an unassailable and messy whole is precisely how the call to Chinese nationalism is no more than a utilitarian chain whose purpose isn't to define a nation, or a nation's people, but to subjugate whatever audience it may lay claim to.  Were this mess of what constitutes a Chinese to be taken seriously, the identity of a “Chinese” would be most schizophrenic indeed.

One could likewise observe how the idea of a Han Chinese identity would fall apart pretty quickly on both ethnic and civic/cultural grounds once you factor in the observable effects of geography on the centuries of interbreeding (and lack thereof), both in blood and language, so much so that the language of the Cantonese is mutually unintelligible with the tongue of the Fujianese, that the funeral customs of Sichuan would look alien to the most accepting Shanghainese, and that the adage of “All Chinese look alike” is indeed a racist generalisation, for no inhabitant of this East Asian land would be unable to differentiate the telling physical differences between a Beijingese and a Hongkonger.  All these, of course, could be wily dismissed by those who (mis-)follow the school of thought where nations are imagined, and thus as long as the ruling Beijing and the majority of her followers imagine Hongkongers to be part of this “Chinese” whole, it is democratically just to accept that, yes, Hongkongers are “Chinese”, too.  All the more lamentable is the reality, in fact, when it is not only the Beijingese, but also a substantial amount of Hongkongers, who buy into this line of thought.

“Chinese nationalism” fails to be nationalism at all

What, then, could the Hong Kong Nationalists offer as a rebuttal?  The answer is simple: Chinese nationalism fails as nationalism.  That is to say, Chinese nationalism is not nationalism.  To support this argument one might need to devote several lifetimes' work into defining “what is nationalism” academically, which is commendable as an intellectual pursuit on its own, but infinitely unhelpful to the situation that Hongkongers are facing with our limited time, quickly running out.  Thus sweeping away all academic considerations on the clinical definitions of nationalism and focusing on the most important thing at hand --- the people of the nation --- one arrives at a common thread that permeates through all definitions: that nationalism is a supreme uniting force for the people, by the people, of the people.  It is a noble call to arms, a sense of camaraderie with those with whom you know you share a common ground.  It is a promise that someone you might not know personally has your back covered on matters important.  And most importantly, it is an exclusive force, for it defines clearly its criteria for inclusion, and from it do the nationals derive their shared pride --- whether in culture, in blood, or in myth.

Let us ask, then, what are the effects of the question, “Are you not Chinese?” upon the accused Hongkongers.  It is not a noble call, but a condescending subjugation of the Hongkonger identity.  It is not a celebration of camaraderie, but a shaming order for compliance and obedience.  It is not a recognition for common ground, but an admission of a lack thereof.  It is not a promise of support, but a threat of public guilt.  And most damningly, it does not evoke pride in Hongkongers, but instead demands submission and self-deletion.  The question is not so much as a reminder of Sinic brotherhood but a memo on Sinic domination.  To tell a Hongkonger he or she is Chinese is anything but a nationalistic call --- Chinese imperialism is alive and well, and no matter of rebranding can the leopard change its spots, oppressive blemishes and all.

[HKUSU Undergrad] The Price Paid After the Struggles

The Price Paid After the Struggles

Translated by pseudol, written by Deborah Tsoi [Undergrad May 2017, HKUSU]
Original: https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B4U2Gdqux68-ZTZZa2t0SzE3RUk/view 

Hong Kong 1956 riots

hkmemory.org; 1956 riots

On 1956 Double Ten Day (the National Day of the Republic of China), some rightists, supported by Kuomintang spies, rioted after their flags were destroyed by officers of the Resettlement Department. Crimes including arson and robbery, rape and murder were committed. More than 300 people were injured, including Fritz Ernst, the vice-consul of Switzerland in Hong Kong, and his wife. This was the deadliest riot in the history of Hong Kong.

1967 Riot

Apple Daily; 1967 riot

In May 1967, a labour strike was staged in an artificial flower factory in San Po Kong. Police opened fire on workers which sparked off rioting. The leftists, instigated by China’s Cultural Revolution, confronted the British Hong Kong Government by planting real and fake bombs all over Hong Kong: 1167 in total. At least 52 people died, including 10 police officers. More than 802 people were injured, of whom 212 were police. 1936 people were prosecuted for offences committed during the rioting.

1994 Whitehead Disturbance

A hunger strike launched by Vietnamese boat people in protest against the territory’s repatriation policy degenerated into rioting and acts of arson. A joint operation was carried out to clear the camp, with more than 100 officers and helicopters from Government Flying Service deployed. 500 tear gas canisters were fired by police and correctional officers who met strong resistance during the crackdown.

2000 Hei Ling Chau Disturbance

Around 400 local and Vietnamese inmates were involved in a gang fight at Hei Ling Chau Drug Addiction Treatment Centre. They threw hard objects at police and correctional officers and attempted to set fire to the prison. Tear gas was deployed to quell the disturbance. Multiple injuries were caused. About 20 persons involved were convicted of rioting and received prison sentences ranging from 2 to 10 years.

The court cases following the Umbrella Movement in late 2014 and the Mong Kok Incident in early 2016 have not yet ended. Demonstrators in the Umbrella Movement were charged in succession, having been arrested one by one and some are now facing heavy sentences. This is undoubtedly a year of discouragement and frustration. Charged and convicted protesters face imprisonment and the loss of freedoms. Instead of showing empathy, many people took positions against the protesters. Surely, they had to pay the price for their unlawful actions. However, what kind of attitude should we adopt? How should we look at them? Court judgments do not mean in any way that the rule of law and justice are upheld. Conversely, the courts can become a political tool. Biased and exaggerated news reports may not reflect reality, but give rise to misunderstandings which intensify echo chamber effect and social polarisation. When commenting on protesters, I believe members of the public should take their motives, circumstances and the social context into account to make a fair judgement.

After the Umbrella Movement

Just one day after the Chief Executive Election, a new chapter of political persecution was effected. All nine Occupy Central founders - Benny Tai Yiu-ting, Chan Kin-man and Reverend Chu Yiu-ming, lawmakers Tanya Chan and Shiu Ka-chun, the Democratic Party’s Lee Wing-tat, former leader of the Hong Kong Federation of Students Eason Chung Yiu-wah, Tommy Cheung Sau-yin and League of Social Democrats vice-chairman Raphael Wong Ho-ming - were charged with the common law crime of committing public nuisance. The maximum penalty for that offence is a seven-year term of imprisonment. The sentence for the common law offence is heavier than those for of public nuisance under the Summary Offences Ordinance and unlawful assembly under the Public Order Ordinance. The Civic Party’s Alan Leong suspects charging the nine for the common law offence is a political decision based on the higher maximum penalty. Some others also said that so doing aimed at evading the sensitive issue of freedom of assembly.

2016 Mong Kok Civil Unrest

Key words: Hawkers, Illegality, Glass, Bricks, Arson, Rioters, Severe punishment, Deterrence

Many people felt that while the protesters’ actions were too violent and threatened others’ safety, it was unforgivable for the police to fire warning shots. Therefore, they blamed both the police and protesters equally. The charges against 91 protesters in total included rioting, arson, unlawful assembly, assault on police officers, possession of offensive weapons and public nuisance. Several participants were convicted. One of them was sentenced to nine-month imprisonment for assaulting police and resisting arrest. Three (including one student from the University of Hong Kong) received a three-year prison sentence for rioting. Another will spend four years and nine months in jail for arson. Hongkongers were charged and convicted of rioting for the first time since rioting was made an offence in the 1970s.

The Mong Kok civil unrest was classified as a riot. Many people have questioned the heaviness of the sentences. After taking into account the background of the defendant, reasons of the mitigation plea and motives for committing the crime, could the judge impose deterrent sentences?

Motives behind the struggle

Judge Sham Siu-man said in his judgment that “Violence is violence and there is no difference. Should lenient sentences be imposed to those who expressed discontent with the government? Should they be imposed to those with loftier ideals even though the level of violence was the same?” It's impossible to generalise when discussing the various acts of violence: they cannot be viewed in black and white terms. If the court does not take motives and intentions into consideration when meting out a penalty, what is the point of making a plea in mitigation?

There is no doubt that the Umbrella Movement was a civil disobedience movement. Participants placed great emphasis on the long-term interests of the public in their fight for social justice. They hoped to force the regime to face public opinion and give a more democratic proposal on universal suffrage through practising non-violent disobedience. However, among those tens of thousands of participants, not all of them fully supported the philosophy of civil disobedience. Instead, many protesters were motivated to act by the firing of 78 tear gas canisters and so wished to collaborate with the students to face down the political machine. Their reasons changed with the environment. They had no choices to commit crimes but were unwilling to resign themselves to fate. The forcefulness of Leung Chun-ying encouraged more and more people to join the Umbrella Movement.

In the Mong Kok civil unrest, the motives of protesters were even more complicated.

Dissatisfied with the government’s crackdown on hawkers, some responded to the appeal made by political organisations and went to the scene to lend their support. Some took to the streets up in arms over the police firing of warning shots. Some bore longer grudges against the style of policing in Hong Kong while some were dissatisfied with the government. Unlike the relatively planned and organised Umbrella Movement, the Mong Kok Civil Unrest was more spontaneous and lacked proper organisation. The flames of violence flared up as conflicts escalated. Frankly, many of the participants were driven by emotion as they threw bricks and glass bottles. They relied on sheer luck to avoid arrest. However, even though we cannot articulate every protester's motive, they had in common a fight, not for personal gain, but for societal interests. Their actions, which attempted to protect other protesters, were altruistic.

Judge Anthony Kwok, who was responsible for the rioting case, stated that this riot was more serious than the Whitehead Disturbance. The obstinate insistence of the police was key in turning the mayhem in Mong Kok into a riot and added fuel to the fire. The clashes were completely out of control. The police hoped to clear the hawkers at an early stage and spoiled the pleasure of fishball lovers by deploying a Police Tactical Unit. Plainclothes officers brandished batons and used pepper spray against those protesting the clearout. In consequence, the protesters sought revenge by throwing objects at the scene. However, in the case of the Whitehead Disturbance, the lawyer for the first defendant in the Mong Kok clashes said, “Vietnamese boat people used self-made weapons to attack another group of refugees. Their acts were apparently premeditated.” The two cases were completely different in terms of motive.

Conclusion: How should we look at the protesters?

The court’s ruling is out of public control. However, instead of sneering, severing ties with the persons involved and rubbing salt into protesters’ wounds, I believe the public should sympathise with them and understand the difficulties of our society. A helping hand should be lent to those peers behind bars. 

Perhaps to many, protesters embracing the rule of “non-violence” is crucial. Yet, what is more important than to think about their reasons for taking risks?  It took time for protesters’ sentiments to develop. 

Persecution by the police in previous social movements, the suppression tactics of the regime in various controversies and the failure of "peaceful, rational and non-violent" protest movements culminated in the use of violence. These arguments do not aim to absolve those who cause harm to others, but to point out that the public should think and question whether the assumption that "as long as violent behaviours are involved, things become definitely evil" is correct. The degree of acceptance of various behaviours changes over time and in different contexts. Some people agreed the act of throwing bottles was shocking and disconcerting. However, does that not imply that the firing of shots by the police unlocked Pandora's box by promoting the use of violence? I believe people with a conscience would not make heartless and harsh comments after reflection.

In the future, the Hong Kong communist regime will seek to put the participants of the Umbrella Movement and the protesters of the Mong Kok Civil Unrest in jail. I beseech every Hongkonger not to blame the protesters. This extra burden of blame should not be added to their lot: rather, more support should be provided.

[HKBUEB] What Is Agriculture in Hong Kong Indeed?

What Is Agriculture in Hong Kong Indeed?

Translated by Natalie Lung, edited by Chen-t'ang, written by Edith Lam (Jumbo, 48th Editorial Board of HKBU)
Original: http://issuu.com/_hkbusueb/docs/jumbo_48.1 [pp. 47-50] 2015 

A brief history of agriculture in Hong Kong

In the 1950s, immigrants from Mainland China (China) became the majority of Hong Kong’s farming population and grew rice for a living in Yuen Long and Fan Ling in the New Territories. Due to the development of new towns in the 60s, they shifted their focus to growing vegetables. The original agricultural labour force gradually decreased under urbanisation.

Ten years later, China lifted the export quota of vegetable produce to Hong Kong, thus forcing local vegetable farmers to pivot again—to fishing or animal rearing. 

In the matter of a few decades, land used for farming drastically dropped from the then thirteen thousand hectares to the present seven hundred or so hectares. Self-sufficiency rate went from a peak of 50% to today’s 2%. 

Agricultural land in Hong Kong today are mainly distributed in the north to northeast New Territories: Fan Ling North, Kwu Tong North, and Ta Kwu Ling; and the west to northwest area: Kam Tin and Pat Heung. 

From yesterday’s thriving agriculture to today’s financial and real estate industries, the Pearl of the Orient has replaced the fishing village—is the decline of agriculture merely a natural progression of history, or is it disregarding diverse, sustainable development?

Indispensable local agriculture

Why should agriculture be revived when Hong Kong has been heavily reliant on imported food for the last few decades?

The main reason is to attain a certain degree of food self-sufficiency; in other words, it is to reach a certain self-sufficiency rate.

Each country must have a food producing industry to minimise its reliance on imports and to reduce the effects of food price inflation.

During the 1967 labour strikes, hawkers and meat suppliers refused to deliver their goods; even pork and vegetables that had already been shipped from the Mainland to the train station in Hong Kong had to be returned. This lasted for four days. 

Since 60% of food came from Mainland back then, a shortage in the supply of agricultural produce emerged. Food prices soared twofold. But it was the self-sufficiency in farm produce Hong Kong had that pulled the city through the crisis. 

In 2012, the supply of Choi Sum from China dropped by three to four% due to a cold climate. Vegetable prices surged from five to six dollars per kilo up to twenty dollars per kilo. The public was forced to purchase expensive vegetables. 

With today’s agricultural labour force in the Mainland shrinking due to urbanisation, farmers’ wages would definitely increase. Coupled with the continuous revaluation of the Renminbi, it can be easily foreseen that Mainland vegetables would become increasingly expensive even without accounting for environmental factors. 

If Hong Kong continues to rely on China's vegetable supply without its own agriculture, the vegetable price would surely fluctuate.

Hong Kong also needs local agriculture to improve food safety. News about tainted food produce is not new. The import of contaminated vegetables from Dongguan in 2012 left many stunned; even after the matter was cleared up, members of the public still felt wary.

In 2015, Cable News uncovered a tainted vegetable smuggling incident where vegetables with exceeding levels of pesticides were directly shipped and sold at several wet markets, circumventing tests at the Centre for Food Safety. This was all unbeknownst to consumers.

If there is local agriculture, Hong Kong people could enjoy more produce that is grown on healthy land and on fertiliser whose source is clearly known, in turn safeguarding food safety.

Kadoorie Farm.

Land shortage: an obstacle for agriculture development

It is no doubt that land shortage is the biggest obstacle for local agricultural development. 

According to the Agriculture, Fisheries and Conservation Department, Hong Kong has 4,523 hectares of farm land, but active agricultural land only amounts to 729 hectares, and only 298 of those are used to grow vegetables. 

People who desire to farm could hardly rent land in the New Territories. Although they could reach out to landlords and seek suitable land through the Agricultural Land Rehabilitation Scheme, the average waiting time is five years. Furthermore, the quality of farmland is uneven in quality. 

At present, there are 3,794 hectares of vacant farm land. Land ownership is concentrated among indigineous people and developers who have had no desire to rent the land out to farmers.

Some of the land has been hoarded for developers to purchase for the development of new towns; Some has been repurposed for illegal uses such as outdoor warehouses, container yards, chop shops, and waste recycling yards. 

In addition, Hong Kong has 803 hectares of brownfield sites—farmland that has been destroyed by construction waste and concrete. They could hardly be turned into arable land again as the environment and ecosystem around it have been destroyed.

Non-indigenous farmers also suffer from short-term leases. Most farmland is leased to farmers on a two-to-five-year contract, but building infrastructure like water canals, conducting water and land observations, and adjusting plantation methods take two years, and the instability of renewing a lease leaves people worried about not being able to breakeven before land is taken away from them. 

Under such substantial risk, farmers become reluctant to make long-term investments, indirectly minimizing the potential for agricultural development. 

Policies ignore the root of the problem

The new agriculture policy proposed by former Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying in his 2015 Policy Address comprises four main goals:

The policy’s consultation document advocated the use of technology for sustainable agricultural development. It included several examples of modern agricultural production methods, such as organic farming, greenhouse production, etc., and pointed out how hydroponic farming practices in Singapore and greenhouse farming in London can raise agriculture productivity.

Agricultural organizations and academics believe that the government did not consider the long-term planning of agriculture development in the consultation document.

A major criticism was the absence of a target for self-sufficiency rate. The document mentioned the need for increasing agriculture productivity but it did not set clear metrics for such a goal. It criticises self-sufficiency rate as a metric that values quantity over quality, and setting such a target would instead cause productivity to drop, making it an unrealistic reference for food supply. 

As a matter of fact, many countries around the world have set goals for self-sufficiency. While China’s Ministry of Agriculture had required Guangzhou to set a self-sufficiency target of 50% or above for live pork by 2016, the Hong Kong government is avoiding the self-sufficiency issue that is causing huge ramifications on food safety.

The policy also did not account for the use of the 70 to 80 hectare farmland outside the Agricultural Park. 

Resolving the shortage and the deliberate destruction of farmland are key factors for developing agriculture. The aforementioned 3,000 or so hectares of abandoned farmland should be utilised to increase the area of active agricultural land and the output of crops. Meanwhile, the document did not propose a resolution to the brownfield sites issue that has arisen due to the government’s loose grip on illegal soil dumping, nor has there been any measures to crack down on such illegal behaviour.

Furthermore, the idea of the Agricultural Park has been criticised as unrealistic.

Nowadays, many farmers live in farmhouses next to their land in the New Territories. Such an arrangement allows them to care for their crops any time of the day, which could also reduce the time for travelling to and from the city.

But Agri-Park is an earmarked piece of land that would be leased out to farmers on 5-year contracts, and with no supporting infrastructure, it goes against the customary practice of farmers living and working on the same piece of land. Many problems will arise if the Agri-Park is built.

Academics predict that the agriculture fund would go to industry practitioners who own capital and large-scale vegetable markets, robbing small farmers of chances to improve their livelihood.

The funding scheme aims to reward high-tech agricultural production, such as the introduction of machinery and other modern methods, all of which cost a fortune and are impossible for ordinary farmers to afford.

Take hydroponic farming as an example. It is an indoors plantation method which uses nutrient solution and does not require soil. This way, crops can be arranged in vertically stacked layers. However, basic equipment costs $3 million—that is excluding energy costs. Small farmers who could not afford to employ technology in their farming techniques are essentially placed out of reach of funding assistance. 

On the other hand, vegetable farmers who moved up to China in the 1990s to grow their crops and may now have higher economic status may return to Hong Kong to become the main beneficiaries of the scheme.

Furthermore, the two overseas use cases of agricultural technology mentioned in the consultation report are not worthy of reference. 

The hydroponic techniques used in Singapore are highly energy-inefficient and cause destruction to the environment, not to mention their sky-high costs compared to organic farming. 

Hydroponic farming consumes much energy to power water pumping, lighting systems and the production of nutrient solution. If hydroponic farming is to be practiced on farm land in Hong Kong, there is first a need to remodel the land into concrete ground. Industrial farming methods and the use of chemical fertilizers containing heavy metals will then introduced. It is obvious that hydroponic farming is not an environmentally-friendly and sustainable way to grow crops. 

The document also referred to London’s 120-hectare greenhouse and its high GDP value, but the size of farms in the New Territories are only 0.2 hectares on average. Land over a hundred hectares is hard to come by in Hong Kong. 

These two examples are an indication for the government’s top-down mindset for development and ultimately, their ineptness to understand the reality of the agriculture industry.

What are the ways out for agriculture development?

The prospect of increasing agricultural productivity does not lie solely in large-scale plantation. Neither is the goal of Hong Kong’s agriculture development to produce the volumes that would allow for exports. Small-scale agricultural models—community or combined farming—may be more viable.

According to the Trade and Environment Review released by the United Nations in 2013, organic, small-scale farming is the only sustainable mode of agricultural development. 

Unlike industrial farming, the small-scale farming model share a more intimate connection with the natural ecosystem. Agriculture should not be seen solely as an industry that produces food, but rather, one that protects natural scenery, biodiversity, water and land resources.

In addition to resource-recycling, having agriculture in our society can help safeguard local food safety. Fresh crops grown by local farms could be delivered and sold at farmers’ markets on the same day. People could know where their vegetables came. If they were dissatisfied with the quality of vegetables, their feedback could be reflected to farmers directly. Communication between the consumer and producer can be increased.

Reusing residential and commercial food waste as fertilizers not only reduces waste, but it also ensures that the fertilizer is safe to use, which further safeguards the quality of crops. 

Academics predict that farming would resume on more than 3,000 hectares of idle farm land. Based on the degree of food consumption in Hong Kong, a 27% self-sufficiency rate could be attained.

Food waste is a severe problem in Hong Kong. Given that over one third of solid waste produced by the city is food waste, if food waste is reduced, self-sufficiency rate could reach an estimated 40%, which is enough to satisfy a certain degree of Hong Kong’s food supply.

But the new agriculture policies’ focus on modernization technology distances agriculture and the environment, and neglects the consequences of high carbon emissions and environmental pollution. 

Academics describe high-tech agricultural development as nuclear power: both have high production value, but the price of destroying the environment is something that the public can hardly afford to pay.

Agriculture and cities are inseparable; their development requires holistic and clear land planning. Relying on advanced technologies and putting off land issues can only do so much to solve the root problems.

“There’s no agriculture without farmland”

Facing shortage of farmland, some farmers believe the government should adopt policies that would encourage developers to release the hoarded farmland. For example, the Chinese government charges an idle land tax on land that has not been developed or falls short of the required ratio of constructed area to proposed constructed area. They could even reclaim the idle land.

Hong Kong should also adopt similar policies, encouraging developers to lease their land to farmers to avoid penalty. 

In addition, with the copious amounts of farmland being converted to other uses and to brownfield sites, the government should first improve its planning policy.

Each area of land on the plan has one of these two uses: “Column One use” refers to “uses always permitted” and “Column Two use” refers to “uses that would require permission from the Town Planning Board”, so land that has been earmarked as farm land does not necessarily serve the sole purpose of agriculture, but could also be used for housing or clubhouses.

Recently, some developers proposed three applications, including one to build 270 low-density apartment buildings and an international boarding school in the Tsiu Keng agricultural zone in Kwu Tung South. The proposal was accepted because farm land in the area in question has “school” listed under one of its “Column Two use”. 

Academics pointed out that between 1997 and 2002, 1070 of the 1734 applications for land use change were successful, in other words, a 60% success rate. 

The government does not have regulations on the proportion of the land that is used for farming, and with the low threshold on land use change, zoning plans for agriculture exist in name only.

There also exists loopholes in Town Planning Board’s regulations. Private land that has been excluded from the Development Permission Areas Plan (i.e. the first version of the Outline Zoning Plan (OZP) cannot be regulated, leading to the rise of numerous brownfield site issues, such as the fly-tipping in idle farmland in Pui O in 2015. 

As for farmland that has been included in the district plan blueprint, the government has been ineffective in enforcement and tolerant of destructive practices. 

In fact, the above planning problems has been a topic of discussion for a long time, but government has been consistently indifferent, just as it has been in formulating the new agricultural policies.

Who’s gaining under this policy?

In Hong Kong Connection aired on 16 March 2015, the RTHK-produced Chinese TV programme on current affairs, Chairman of the Federation of Agricultural Associations of Hong Kong Chan Kin-yip pointed out that this consultation paper reflects on the feedback given from his group to the government on agriculture policy and the concept of Agricultural Park.

The organization, which was established in 2013 to push for sustainable agricultural development in Hong Kong, comprises all members of the Chief Executive Election Committee from the agricultural and fisheries sector. They make up 60 of the 1200-person committee, and was elected by 159 industry representatives. 

The agricultural and fisheries sector has been receiving subsidy from the Ministry of Agriculture of China since 2009. Between 2009 and 2012, they have received a total of RMB2.2 billion in subsidy. To become eligible for subsidy, fishermen have to hold a fishing permit in China. Successful applicants could receive RMB600,000 to RMB700,000 in fuel subsidy. 

In the second round of consultations on political reforms, the agriculture and fisheries sector supported the August 31st decision by the NPC.

Profiteering in the name of development

Kwu Tung North development plan.

Plans for the development of the northeastern New Territories started as early as 1996. The government led the application for land-use change of a total of 333 hectares of farmland in Kwu Tung North and Fan Ling North for residential or commercial use, which will be used for the new town extensions of Fan Ling and Sheung Shui. Land was taken away from near ten thousand villagers who were then forced to move away. Former Secretary for Development Paul Chan Mo-po and his wife also became a target for acquisition, and was going to be compensated with over $10 million. The development was an estimated $120 billion project, building 60,000 residential flats, with private housing taking the majority. 

The establishment of this plan had to go through Environmental Impact Assessment, deliberation by the Town Planning Board, and appropriation by the Legislative Council before it could go into action. Since pro-establishment legislators take up the majority seats in LegCo, it is hard to have the real public opinion reflected, hence preparation period is the major battleground for members of the public to prevent the project from going forward.

The Town Planning Board has the power over land use planning but it is chaired by a member of the Development Board, its members are either government officials, government-appointed, or those who do not reveal their identity to the public. 

Despite having 90% opposition rate and a total of 50,000 appeal letters and proposals, the North East New Territories development plan was still approved by the Town Planning Board.

In June 2014, the preliminary budget for the plan was quickly approved as Finance Committee chair Ng Leung-sing was filibustering, the same day on which there were protests and clashes outside LegCo.

In 2015, the government officially moved forward with the North East New Territories in-situ land exchange policy, in which land in two development zones is planned for private development. Under the scheme, if the land is larger than 4,000 sq.m. and is owned by a sole landlord, the landlord could apply for land use change from agriculture to high value-added uses, such as residential or commercial uses, but these land sites have to be vacated before April 2016. 

Land resumption proceedings in North East New Territories was set to begin in 2017, but the establishment of such policy encourages developers to force farmers out as early on as possible. 

It is believed that the Ping Che area, an area that was originally in the NE New Territories development plan but eventually excluded, will be included in the North New Territories development plan. 

Conclusion

Agriculture development does not only concern the interests of rural residents. In fact, it is linked to complex political and economic interests, beneath which lies all sorts of evil and injustice. All we can hope for is unity among people and the courage to challenge the authority to protect our city.

HKBU Editorial Board Facebook Page: www.facebook.com/busueb 

Guo Wengui: Cross-border law enforcement in HK; PRC uses real estate to manipulate HK’s economy

Guo Wengui: Cross-border law enforcement in HK; PRC uses real estate to manipulate HK’s economy

Original: 1 / 2 / 3 / 4 / 5 

Lau Ping 劉冰 @ Next Magazine, 3 May 2017

(1)
Guo Wengui made the entire CCP Politburo headaches, Interpol issuing a Red Warrant, and China’s Min. of Foreign Affairs to exert pressure to US congress for ending his tip-off programme on VOA. It is only him who will need the entire country’s force to deal with.

Also known as Miles Kwok, Guo said his family foundation controls over US$280 bn, enjoying lots of luxury products, cars, private jets, flats, etc. Challenging the Party is to “save his life, keep his money and revenge”, Guo claimed.

After the VOA programme was terminated, journalists and editors involved were either suspended or brought away by security guards. Guo disappeared in the press. Next Magazine found him, and he tipped off about HK.

Guo was a grass-root with low qualifications, but with good persuasion, he managed to gain a seat in the officialdom and the business world. According to China, he bribed the deputy minister of PRC Min. of State Security, and Party secretaries in Hebei and Henan have to listen to him. With these forces backing, he once called the shot in China.

Guo recently released two astonishing news - (1) President Xi Jinping does not trust CCDI head Wang Qishan and secretly asked deputy minister of public security to investigate Wang’s family and Meng Jianzhu (Secretary of Political and Judiciary Commission, Central Committee of Chinese Communist Party).

(2) Guo also disclosed an implicit relationship of HNA Group. Guo, in the programme, said Wang Qishan’s wife Yao Mingshan, and her nephew Yao Qing, hold shares of HNA Group. Wang Qishan’s father-in-law is Yao Yilin, once the Premier of State Council.

Guo became a globally wanted person, making him famous. China will soon have its 19th Congress. With such power battle, people are focused on whether Guo will keep tipping off.

TIP-OFF 1: MSS & MPS Officers Work in HK for Long Time

Next: You said Min. of State Security and Min. of Public Security have cross-border law enforcement in HK. What are the details?

Guo: Compatriots in HK are too honest. There are so many MSS and MPS officers working and investigating in HK. I know that at least there are long-term offices in China Res. Bldg., Causeway Bay and Fo Tan. At least 300 PRC officers are staying HK for law enforcement on a long term basis. They often go to search houses, knock people’s doors, check information in banks, stalk people, etc. This is already law enforcement in HK.

Some media said Ma Jian (former deputy minister of MSS) received two flats in Taikoo Shing from me. The two flats were opened and searched for times. You can think about that, was that HK police opening the door? Certainly not, who then? They must be from PRC, PRC cops are searching flats everywhere.

Before coming to the US, I was in HK and met these people frequently. Some from Beijing Public Security Bureau, from “Security Ministry”, intel people from General Staff Dept Session 2. At least few thousands work in HK.

- - -

Next Magazine asked him to prove. Guo said he has the info at hand but will disclose that to the public by himself later on.

Next Magazine asked HK police whether MSS and MPS officers have searched for evidence and enforce law in HK. HK police’s reply was “no comment”.

(2)

Guo continued to spill the beans - the high land premium thing by PRC consortia was actually a “sand dilution scheme”. PRC wants to dilute HK people with PRC people, and hope Chinese capital to take over HK’s economy and livelihood.

TIP-OFF 2: High Land Premium = “Sand Dilution Scheme”
Next: HNA Group from China bid lots of land sites with high price in HK in the past 12 months. It won sites in Kai Tak with extremely high prices, surprising the market. (Video clip: Over $27.2 bn spent on sites in Kai Tak)

Guo: They buy land sites in HK but not for development. This is “sand dilution scheme”. Firstly, send more immigrants to HK. Dilute HK people with PRC people, then there will be no more “HKers”.

Secondly, “diluting sand” financially. When PRC real estate tycoons take over, HK developers won’t have a chance, and only PRC will control the entire real estate market. Controlling real estate market is controlling the life of HK. He can make your prices slump by 50%, then HKers will commit suicide. He can also make prices surge to a level you can’t afford. Real estate is a real political conspiracy.

Half of the land premium paid by HNA Group were borrowed from local banks in HK. If they can’t repay, this is tantamount to “hijacking” with PRC banks. That would be “too big to fail”. HK’s economy will be hijacked, and the commoners dare not challenge it.

There will be a very huge catastrophe in HK, financially, politically and in terms of global reputation. There will be huge incident(s).

Next: What is the relationship between HNA Group and Wang Qishan?

Guo: Wang is backing. Wang is a shareholder, or else how can HNA Group bring hundreds of billions out from China? How is that possible? It is certainly abnormal. Of course, Wang’s family is HNA’s shareholder and boss.

In the past you may believe - would Wang and his family do that? No one would believe that. HK is under Secretary Meng Jianzhu’s hands. He can do whatever he wants under Meng’s control.
- - -
Next Magazine asked what proof do Guo have to certify the relationship between HNA Group and Wang, but he did not provide any concrete evidence.

(3)
With a heavy Northeastern accent, this super-billionaire also teased the second-generation rich in HK to please Beijing officials for their shelter. Guo said, “it is too pathetic and selfish, without regarding HK people’s overall interests”. After leaving China, he now lives in the US. He remained luxurious, and often post supercars and flats in the UK and the US. He boasted 29 cars, including McLaren P1, LaFerrari, Koenigsegg CCX, Apollo etc. Benz also designed a bespoke car for his safety.

He said he has three houses in Manhattan, NY. One was bought with US$80mn, with a gym room. Guo claimed that he will do gym 6 days a week, 2 hours a day. He posted a lot of exercise pics on Twitter.

TIP-OFF 3: Pathetic to See HK Billionaires to Please Beijing Officials
Next: Do you know billionaires in HK?
Guo: I knew loads of them. HK billionaires all go to Beijing and please officials, begging for their shelter (figuratively), but don’t forget - they are just used tools.

Second generation rich in HK are very arrogant to the public in HK, but they squat on the floor (figuratively) without dignity. Isn’t it pathetic? I knew a lot of rich men. Rich men in the past were well respected, but for their own benefits, they lost such dignity. It’s too pathetic.
- - -
Next Magazine kept asking about names of these rich men but Guo did not reply.

(4)
HK people believed the outlook is dim, and One Country, Two Systems cannot be realized. HK gradually becomes a normal city in PRC. There are some voices of emigration in recent years. Guo emigrated long ago, but he ridiculed HK people.

Guo said, “You want to emigrate, where do you want to go? Your home was grabbed, and you are leaving. You are not protecting your home and you are leaving. HK people’s minds are problematic. That is escape, not emigration”.

He urged HKers to voice their views and strive, as the situation in HK is sad.

However, Guo has emigrated to lots of countries. It is said that he has given up China’s household registration, and owns 11 passports, including US and UK ones. He also tweeted about having residency in Abu Dhabi. It is learnt that he has an HKID card too, renaming himself as “Guo Haoyun 郭浩雲”. In 2011, through a BVI company, he bought two super big houses in 20 and 22 South Bay Road, Repulse Bay. It is reported that his son, Guo Qiang, once entered the houses.

Guo kept posting his recent status, including his jogs and so on. It seemed that he doesn’t care about CCP’s suppression. Next Magazine contacted Guo through WhatsApp. His profile picture is a photo with him and Dalai Lama.

Guo said “I will, in a certain period of time, be loud about HK, not getting quiet. Just like things on the Mainland, if I speak up, I will be loud”.

His phone can only receive WhatsApp message but can’t be called. The journalist sometimes did not receive his reply even waiting midnight. When the journalist wanted to do a more in-depth interview, he said he will consider it as many media in HK are finding him.

(5, some duplicated parts have been deleted)

South Bay Road houses were reported to have illegal structures. Our journalist went there and discovered construction works are going on. The journalist asked whether Guo’s family is in there, but security guards blocked our coverage and cameras.

Guo can tip off such important intel because he has a strong “shelter” above. Former deputy minister of MSS Ma Jian, Party secretary of Hebei Province Zhang Yue and Henan Party standing committee member Wang Youjie were some of the “shelter sources”. Ma Jian was under probe due to corruption charges. Guo was a friend of secret police chief, so Guo left China and started his life in the US.

According to CCP, Ma was removed in 2015. In a video, Ma said he knew Guo in 2008, and Guo knew if he gets close to Ma, Guo’s business kingdom can be protected.

Ma confessed in the clip, “From 2018 to 2014, I used my authority and duty convenience to help Guo a lot on Guo’s own problem and his company operations”.

What is most ruthless? Guo also used a “shelter” - the secret service system to get rid of people he dislikes. Qu Long, former executive director of Beijing Zenith Real Estate (Zhengquan Zhiye, in Pinyin), was an underling of Guo. Due to business disputes, Qu reported Guo. Guo asked for help from Ma Jian and Zhang Yue. Ma and Zhang removed Qu with their authorities. They contacted Public Security Dept of Hebei Province. Chengde Court of Hebei eventually charged Qu of “illegal possession of guns” for 15 years. It is reported that Qu has been sent to Beijing for helping the probe into Guo Wengui.

Ma took RMB60 mn bribe. Ma confessed that around 2011, Guo bought two flats for me in Taikoo Shing, HK, with an area of nearly 200 sq.m.. He spent over HK$30 mn for that. In order to avert risks, the properties were under the name of my nephew, but the actual owner is Ma himself.

Ma also said I bought something in an old stuff market in HK, and I already paid over HK$90,000. Before I return, Guo’s assistant came by and gave me HK$100,000.

After Ma Jian was arrested, Guo claimed that Central Investigation Unit has sent officers to probe into this for times in HK, and even entered flats in Taikoo Shing. The blatant cross-border law enforcement was known by the property security guards. Next Magazine asked for detailed address.

Caixin Weekly once issued an article titled “Power hunter Guo Wengui”, revealing how he used his power and relationship to accumulate wealth. In turn, Guo argued Caixin’s editor-in-chief Hu Shuli had an unusual relationship with (Founder Group’s former CEO) Li You. Guo also claimed that Caixin Media is Wang Qishan’s camp member.

Guo’s Minzu Securities and Founder Group merged. Founder Group’s (former) CEO Li You and Guo had a good relationship, as they took the same private jet to countries. They became enemies when they are fighting for a director seat. After the break-up, they also revealed more. Guo also disclosed the relation network behind Li, including Hu Shuli and Wang Qishan. In Jan 2015, Li was detained due to insider trading. Two months Li was arrested, CIRC chairman Xiang Junbo was probed early Apr 2017. Xiang was the president of ABC, and it is said that Xiang approved RMB3.2 bn loan to Guo, so Xiang was dragged down and probed too.

The entire tip-off involved so many people, including businessmen and higher-ups, and even Politbuto members. This has become highly complex and sensitive. As Guo has been among the higher-ups’ network, and his backings were gradually arrested, every one became more interested in his tip-offs.

Cheng Lap: Why Do We Need Our Country?

Why Do We Need Our Country?

Translated by Peggy, edited by Chen-t'ang, written by Cheng Lap
Original: https://sosreader.com/why-you-need-your-own-country/ 

There is something we always cherish. Unfortunately, we cannot protect them alone. Yet, we want to protect them as best as we can. That is the reason we need our own country. If the country cannot protect what you value, that is not your country. 

There is something one always value. They can be our life, our family, our home, our property, our privacy, our freedom of action and speech, our interest in land and our language, our culture, our religion, as well as our collective memory and our lifestyle. 

We always want to live in a stable environment. We want to speak in our own mother tongue. We also want our friends and relatives speaking in mother language. We want our life are adequately protected. We can live in a safe and comfortable home. We can eat what we like to eat. We can earn a living and enjoy leisure. We want our belief and religion are respected and passed on. 

We want to preserve the films, the books, the places and shops that we encountered at our young age. And we hope they are still there when we are old. We want to provide support for our elderly. Although our memories are fading, we still hope they can become legacies. Although life is short, we still hope all the good memories can last much longer than our life. They can last forever. They can tell the times we live and the culture we share. And they will not be all gone and forgotten.  

From wealth to feeling, emotion and memory, these build our “own self”. They are integral to our life. If they are lost, we will be really upset. That is why we do not want to lose them because they are so important to us. 

If we are alone, we are weak. We do not have enough power to protect things we value. Our life will be endangered by violence. Our property will be usurped. Our freedom will be lost under fear and threat. Our native tongue will be losing slowly if we lose control of education and media. 

These are the things we want to protect. Unfortunately, we cannot protect them alone. Yet, we want to protect them as best as we can. That is the reason we need our own country.

 “Our country” is the institution that is established to protect these things we value. Law exists to protect our life and property. Education passes on our mother language and custom to the next generation. Constitution protects our freedom and rights. Country gathers the power little by little from every one of us. It can be in term of tax or duty. In return, the country protects things we cherish, and enable our lifestyle to continue, develop and last forever. 

You may think that “your nationality reflects your country”. But that is just wrong. If the country does not protect things you cherish, it is not your country. You are just ruled by a country that you don’t belong to and you are only subject to its authority. 

Another country might have very good governance, but after all it is not your country. You may emigrate to a developed Western country. However, if your mother tongue is not the official language there, it is hard to ask them to protect and promote your mother tongue. 

If there is a country that despises your mother tongue, and it even deprives you of your property, threatens your life, destroys your family, eliminates your culture and belief, smears your collective memory, makes you feel unsafe and deprives you of the freedom, that country is not your country even you hold the citizenship of that country by birth. Unfortunately, you are just a slave without dignity. You are like consumable resources that can be sacrificed anytime. 

You are weak and you need to be protected. That is the reason you need your own country. If you do not have your country, you have no dignity. The things you value will not be protected. Even you are obedient, you are doomed to have miserable life and live sadly at old age. 

You need a country. Country exists because it is responsible to you.

[Film Critic] When Hong Kong Laughed at China

[Film Critic] When Hong Kong Laughed at China

Written by Sean Tierney

I recently re-watched Her Fatal Ways, the 1990 comedy starring Carol ‘Dodo’ Cheng as Sister Cheng, a mainland security officer sent to Hong Kong with her cousin, played by writer/director Alfred Cheung, on official police business. Watching the movie now, more than 25 years later, it’s interesting to see the way China and Chinese people from the mainland were, and were portrayed. In 1990, Hong Kong was certainly far ahead of China in many ways. It was easy to look down on mainlanders as uncouth bumpkins, or at least to be benevolently patronizing. Today, the difference gap has closed in many ways.

Her Fatal Ways opens with Sister Cheng and Cousin Shing arriving in Hong Kong by bus. Our first glimpse of Sister Cheng is of her hand, which holds a cigarette. She smokes while singing a patriotic song. A fellow passenger spits on the floor, hitting Cousin Shing’s foot. He responds with profanity. Sister Cheng then chimes in with a brief lesson on the etiquette of spitting, which ends no better than the first incident. In the span of less than a minute, the film has illustrated its protagonists using the stereotypes of the day.  

While simple, bludgeoning parody would have been the easy way out, Albert Cheung (who appears in the film as Cheng’s cousin) lampoons virtually all sides of the political and cultural sphere. Sister Cheng’s Hong Kong professional counterpart is Inspector Wu, played by ‘Big’ Tony Leung (Leung Kar Fai). He’s a young, urbane police detective who dresses stylishly (for the time). It turns out that Wu’s father is an unrepentant Nationalist. Sparks inevitably fly, but so do laughs and the discovery of common ground.

Hong Kong has always been a dynamic city that changes with breathtaking speed. But no one could have foreseen the scope and speed of social and cultural change in China. Sister Cheng seems like the ghost of another age, and indeed she is. I remember meeting people from the Soviet Union in the 1970s, and they were in many ways just like her; marveling at many of the things around them while steadfastly holding to the ideology that told them how wrong it all was. A young person from today’s China would understandably find Her Fatal Ways offensive. They might find the characterization insulting, overblown, or inaccurate. But for people who remember that time, the portrayal is remarkably astute and, in many ways, sympathetic without being patronizing. 

Hong Kong and China shared a common past, a common ethnicity, and in some ways a common culture. But the recent history of the PRC, as well as it’s closed nature for much of its first decades, helped create a large culture gap that language (and food) alone couldn’t reconcile. Today, Hong Kong and China seem in many ways interchangeable, in financial, technological and cultural terms. In other ways, the roles have reversed; Hong Kong cinema now relies on the beneficence of mainland co-productions. And in still other ways, the differences that remain have become markedly acute. Whereas Sister Cheng’s occasional breaches of professional behavior during interrogations were seen as funny or utilitarian, the reality of mainland security officers operating in Hong Kong is now seen as a much more menacing problem. 

In 1990 people could fall back on a belief in One Country Two Systems and thus keep some of the thornier implications of Her Fatal Ways at arms’ length. But that risk is much more prevalent now than it was in 1990. In 2017, a movie about public security running roughshod through the streets of Hong Kong would not be greeted so airily. 

- - -

Also Read:

LCSD Summary: Her Fatal Ways

IMDB Page

A Gentleman’s Guide on Cantonese - Interview with Benjamin Au Yeung by Apertus

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Ching Cheong: Why does Chinese Liaison Office boost Carrie Lam’s chance in full force?

Why does the Chinese Liaison Office boost Carrie Lam’s chance in full force?

Translated by Chen-t'ang 鎮棠, written by Ching Cheong
Original: https://www.hkcnews.com/article/1540/%E4%B8%AD%E8%81%AF%E8%BE%A6%E7%82%BA%E4%BD%95%E5%85%A8%E5%8A%9B%E5%82%AC%E8%B0%B7%E6%9E%97%E9%84%AD%E6%9C%88%E5%A8%A5%EF%BC%9F 

 

The Chinese Liaison Office has left no stone unturned to boost Carrie Lam’s chances in the chief executive race, and that has caused dissatisfaction all over Hong Kong. The LO even dared to bluff Election Committee (EC) members by pretending it is really representing Beijing. The LO also threatened other candidates who might possibly challenge Carrie Lam. Some even said: “Not voting for Carrie Lam means opposition against Beijing.” The LO also made a 700-strong list of nominations for Carrie Lam, which effectively means the Liaison Office wants to “cherry-pick” Hong Kong's chief executive. It is worthwhile to note this.

FIRST, we must clearly realise: the Chinese Liaison Office by no means represents Beijing.

The most obvious evidence is that the LO was completely on the outside when it came to CY Leung not running for a second term. I wrote an article for HKEJ on 8 December 2016, presenting three pieces of evidence that “Beijing is really developing towards the direction of 'giving up CY Leung'”. On the same day, a friend from the leftist camp asked the LO whether my article was true. A vice-ministerial official of the LO said, “Do not believe in rumours,” stressing that “Beijing's attitude is clear: Beijing will support CY Leung for a second term.” Right after that day, CY Leung announced his decision to not run for a second term. This clearly illustrates that not only does the Liaison Office not represent Beijing, but also shows its “outsiderness” when it comes to key issues.

This is not the only faux pas. Another example was the political reform package in 2012. The Democratic Party put forward the “Super District Council“ proposal.   The Office confidently guaranteed that “Beijing won't accept it.” On 14 June 2012, Hao Tiechuan, the Director-General of the Publicity, Culture and Sports Department of the Chinese Liaison Office, described the Democratic Party's proposal of “universal suffrage of District Council representatives” in very harsh words. “No precedent, no legal grounds, no need to come out from the woodwork.” Hao said the Basic Law has no residual power nor is there an ordinance to allow the functional constituency of the District Council to be applied with universal suffrage. On 21 June, chief executive Donald Tsang announced that Beijing had accepted this proposal. The Liaison Office had to do a U-turn. The embarrassing U-turn even made Lau Nai-keung, from the pro-establishment camp, sigh and remark: “The turn is really ugly.”

These two examples fully illustrate that the Chinese Liaison Office does not represent Beijing, nor does it really understand Beijing's mindset. Therefore, I advise EC members to ignore the pressure of the LO.

SECOND, we should be alert to the reason why the Liaison Office spares no effort to boost Carrie Lam.

I believe that among the four candidates (prior to Leung Kwok-hung’s announcement), Carrie Lam is the best representative of CY Leung's policy direction, as she made clear in her first speech when she announced her candidacy. Therefore, supporting Carrie Lam means supporting CY Leung’s policy direction. Why does the Liaison Office feel it has to continue CY Leung's direction? Because, in the past five years, CY Leung has successfully normalised “the governance of Hong Kong by the Liaison Office” and  “filled his cabinet with people from the leftist camp.” Back in March 2012, when CY Leung was successfully elected but before he assumed office, I foresaw the new chief executive would bring four main crises to Hong Kong. The first being “two systems” merging into “one country”; the “mainlandisation” of the government’s ideology; normalisation of the governance of Hong Kong by the Liaison Office; and filling his Cabinet with people from the leftist camp. (19 April 2012, HKEJ).

The developments of the past five years have been the best evidence of my observations. As CY Leung has successfully allowed the Liaison Office to “participate” (or should I say, “interfere”) in the internal affairs of Hong Kong and appointed a lot of people from the leftist camp, therefore, the Liaison Office has the incentive to support CY Leung for another term.  If that proves unsuccessful, then Carrie Lam, who will support the execution of  CY Leung’s policies as the next chief executive, shall have her electoral prospects boosted.

THIRD, the so-called “power struggle” is ridiculous. 

In order to push Carrie Lam to the top job, the Liaison Office even publicised through pro-Beijing media a so-called “power struggle”.  (17 January 2017, Headline Daily). The author of the article argued that choosing Carrie Lam would be protecting or defending Hong Kong’s regime and voting for others would mean losing Hong Kong's regime. There are several amusing points. First, a CE election supposedly conducted in accordance with the Basic Law is now suddenly a “power struggle”. Then why does the Basic Law stipulate such an election in the first place? Second, HKMAO director Wang Guangya already announced that the pan-democratic camp is part of the establishment, and Home Return Permits have been reissued to pan-democratic lawmakers. So even if other candidates win thanks to pan-democratic votes, that only means a different person in the same political spectrum within the establishment camp becomes chief executive. What, then, is the “power struggle?” People affected by the Liaison Office have lost the ability to distinguish rights from wrongs. 

However, the Liaison Office and its underlings are trying to escalate a normal CE election into a “power struggle”. These kind of conspiracy theories make me feel that there is something unusual going on. Continuing CY Leung’s policies can help normalise the governance of Hong Kong by the Liaison Office and fill the cabinet with people from the leftist camp, but on top of that, there might be a more deep seated reason: the Liaison Office intends to put an obedient person in the top job in order to protect the interests of certain people and their respective factions in Hong Kong. This is the key. My suspicion is not groundless because in the past number of years, there have been many signs that suggest this possibility. Some cases now available to the public can illustrate the problem.

A. The Case of Rafael Hui

Former Chief Secretary (CS) Rafael Hui was involved in a corruption case. People saw that former HKMAO director Liao Hui arranged a sum of $10 million to solve Hui’s debt crisis in order to put him in the CS position, so that Hui could be assured of the job instead of working in the private sector. This might only be Hui’s own rhetoric, but I believe this is true because these statements were made by Hui in court. If they were fabricated, he would be charged with perjury and Liao, who would be framed in this scenario, would surely deny. I believe that no one would dare to frame a ministerial leader from the central authority. Now, there are two questions: Why does Liao have to help Hui (in other words, why must Hui become CS to the point Hui has to be helped with such an extraordinary measure? Where did Liao’s $10 million come from (in other words, how did Liao pay this sum of money to Hui)? This unreasonable phenomenon only renders one reasonable explanation, that is: putting Rafael Hui in the position of CS will help Liao Hui protect the interests of his family or his factions in Hong Kong.

Lessons to be learned from Rafael Hui’s case: In order to achieve their goals or objectives, some people might violate the normal employment terms of civil servants and put obedient people in key seats of the HKSAR government (since Hui took the “aid,” he will surely be obedient). In fact, the $10 million sum already constitutes a bribe to Hui, so how can Hui not repay his benefactor when he is CS?

B. The Case of Song Lin

The former chairman of China Resources Group, Song Lin, was charged in Guangzhou on 8 December 2016. Song Lin's corruption case was already reported by Li Jianjun, a journalist from Shanxi Evening Post, to ICAC and the Commercial Crime Bureau (CCB) of the Hong Kong Police Force (HKPF). However it was later discovered that someone from the mainland authorities contacted ICAC through the Liaison Office, saying that the case involves mainland China and it was hoped that ICAC would not interfere. Li Jianjun said, as a matter of fact, some misconduct had taken place in Hong Kong and Macau, and China Resources Power is listed in Hong Kong, therefore the law enforcement agencies of Hong Kong are responsible for investigating this matter. ICAC and CCB did not do anything and did not handle this report.

It is universally known that Song Lin is a “super fan” of CY Leung. He was president of the Hong Kong Chinese Enterprises Association. The association had sixteen votes in the 2012 CE election and all sixteen votes went to CY Leung. The year after CY Leung was elected, Song Lin was immediately appointed as a Justice of Peace and holds various public posts, including becoming a member of the Economic Development Commission and chairman of the Hong Kong Business Ethics Development Advisory Committee (HKBEADC) under ICAC. These acts were criticised as political rewards. How can ICAC receive a report and do nothing at all? I speculate that this may be because ICAC was scared of Song Lin, who holds the title of chairman of HKBEADC. Prosecuting him is pretty much a joke to ICAC itself.

From this, we can conclude that whether or not the CE is obedient is very important. If the CE is obedient enough (such as CY Leung), ICAC would not interfere. Economic Information Daily’s chief journalist Wang Wenzhi reported to the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection (CCDI) about Song Lin on 15 April 2014, along with the photos taken with Song and his mistress together. If that was not reported, Song is probably off scot-free.

Lessons to be learnt from Song Lin’s case: Whether or not a CE is obedient is very important to the interests of various factions of the Communist Party in Hong Kong.

C. The Case of Xiao Jianhua

The case of Xiao Jianhua is definitely the most shocking news in the political field recently. Rich merchant Xiao, who was handling HK$1 trillion for senior officials on the mainland, was “brought back to China”. The truth behind the incident is yet to be ascertained, but the case led to the surfacing of an organisation founded in 2014, known as the Hong Kong Association of Cultural Industries (HKACI). The vice president of HKACI is Xiao Jianhua and the honorary sponsor is CY Leung. The chairman of the HKACI Executive Council is Peter Lam Kin-ngok. Other directors include Henry Cheng Kar-shun (chairman of New World Development), Robert Ng (chairman of Sino Land), Albert Yeung (chairman of Emperor Group), Charles Ho Tsu-kwok (chairman of Sing Tao Group) and Vicki Zhao (a famous Chinese actress). These facts are worth noting for two reasons: It was unconventional before 1997 for the Governor to hold a post in an organisation with complicated political and commercial ties. Under normal circumstances, this would amount to the CE serving as protection and a promotional tool for this organisation. However, this case may involve the top tier, so the CE can do nothing. Second, many of the directors of the organisation joined Carrie Lam's election office.

Lessons to be learnt from Xiao Jianhua’s case: Putting Carrie Lam in the top job would help strengthen the status and protect the interests of this bloc in Hong Kong. However, this bloc has offended the top tier due to unknown reasons, and thus has exceeded the protection that CY Leung can offer.

D. The Case of Anthony Cheng

The nature of this case is different from the earlier three cases. However, this case can clearly illustrate the direct connection between whether a CE is obedient or not, and whose interests the mainland would like to protect. This case, which was concluded in October 2016, showed that Chief Li and Chief Zhang from the United Front Work Department (UFWD, also known as Tongzhanbu) of the CCP had an appointment with online radio host Anthony Cheng through Peggy Gao, a member of the then CE election office of CY Leung. Cheng was asked to reach out to localists and lure them into contesting about 40 District Council constituencies designated by the UFWD.

The objectives of this were to dilute the votes of pan-democratic candidates and to ensure the “iron votes” of the pro-Beijing candidates. Those localists who accept the offer and contest would get $150,000 per person, and it would not matter whether or not they won. If those bribed localists were to challenge incumbent District Council and Legislative Council members, they could even get $250,000. But the condition would be to get 200 votes. We know that the maximum amount of election expenses prescribed by law in DC elections is $48,000. The UFWD's offer is more than three times the prescribed amount. The intention of the attempted bribery is very clear. Hong Kong Indigenous and Youngspiration, two groups advocating independence, were among the localist organisations that were solicited by the UFWD.

Lessons to be learnt from Anthony Cheng’s case: Some people oppose independence on the surface but support separatist groups privately. This self-contradictory stance can only be explained by the fact that the louder the voice of separatists, the more threats there seem to be to national security. Therefore, more fees for maintaining stability (weiwen) will be needed. Superiors have to acknowledge their subordinates' harsh directions are being executed in Hong Kong, that is, creating non-existent “danger” to strengthen their own political status.

These examples illustrate the fact that some forces in mainland China need to support an obedient CE in Hong Kong so as to serve their factions' interests in the city. These interests are the reason that the Liaison Office is hysterically driven to boosting Carrie Lam with ludicrous rhetoric of “power struggle.”