Showing posts with label patriotism. Show all posts
Showing posts with label patriotism. Show all posts

20171207

Nicole Wong: The False Song of Chinese Nationalism

The False Song of Chinese Nationalism
Written by Nicole Wong; originally on Comitium Volume 3 (publication of Hong Kong National Party)
Originally from issuu

Tanni / EJInsight
When Hongkongers first realised that their fate currently lies in the hands of the foreigner, when the first call for Hong Kong Independence was voiced, and when the Hong Kong National Party was first convened, the resounding rebuttal was that of a familiar question: “Are you not a Chinese as well?”  All too familiar indeed is the question, for not only is its contents a cliché, but its accompanying features: the moralising and patronising tone, the aged and wrinkled face, and the underlying sincere belief from the accuser that all parties engaging in the heated debate are, beyond any doubt, Chinese.  The PRC members are Chinese, the Hongkongers are Chinese; the pro-Establishments are Chinese, the pro-Independents are Chinese; you are Chinese, I am Chinese, we are all Chinese.  It is as if the fabled Golden Headband of Journey to the West's Monkey King has come to life, and with the familiar words, the inescapable Chinese identity binds us all to our predestined obedience to our Chinese colonial masters, who are, as we are reminded by this very instant, our beloved brothers in the Sinic brotherhood.

Thus smugly does the self-assured Sinic accuser disarm, without any self-awareness of Stockholm Syndrome, any threats to the imposed Chinese identity.  Those politically engaged amongst you might have noticed that this “call to linked arms” is no novel rhetoric.  Indeed, long since before the sovereignty of Hong Kong was handed from the Brits to the Chinese in 1997, whenever the separate identity of Hongkongers was ever raised, there came inevitably the self-assured, “patriotic” rebuttal: “Are you not Chinese?” And how effective it was in shutting down all discussions!  In an age where both the pro-Beijing and the pan-democrats believe they are merely squabbling brothers born of the same beanstalk [Though it must be said the illusion runs far deeper for the latter.], it is easy to see why the curse is so effective --- to claim you are somehow a different national identity from those with which you share the same nationality is a patently absurd idea.  It is not until very recently when Hongkongers realised that it is the premise of this curse that is the absurd detail: the age-old lie that Hongkongers are “Chinese”, for the specific definition of “Chinese” that this curse implies.  The opposition stops here, though, and most “localists” are content with substituting it with a murky self-identification of “Hongkonger”, after which we observe a mess of competing bikeshedding: whether “Hongkonger” is an ethnic-national identity, civic-national one, or both; when the “historical immigration cut-off” line should be drawn for “Hongkongers” to be considered natives; and so on.  None has recognised and attempted to lob off the chief supporting leg of the argument on the other side: the curse of “Are you not a Chinese?” is allowed to flourish even to this day, because the Hong Kong public still implicitly believes in, in one way or another, the false song of Chinese nationalism.

The “Chinese”: a national identity built on self-defeating ideas

There are many ways to dismantle the lie of Chinese nationalism.  One could observe how it is no more than a continuation of an imperial subject identity, given a modernist and fashionable name when the ROC and then the PRC adopted the idea from Europe.  This particular thrust has been explored by past publications on Comitium by analysing the intentionally woolly definition of the word “Chinese” written in the Chinese script.

The very same word could mean,
1, the pseudo-biological ethnicity of Han Chinese;
2, the legal nationality of a PRC national;
3, the cultural identity of a Chinese transcending legal nationality; and
4, the romantic idea of a single cultural tradition, presumably unbroken for millennia, found in the East Asian territories that are within today's PRC borders. 
The absurdly wide range of definitions contained within this single word has given rise to such claims from a certain Member of the National People's Congress, Michael Tien Puk-sun's mouth, “Just look at our skin [colour], if we weren't Chinese I don't know what we are” (definition by biology) to be followed by “the Chinese nation has its history spanning millennia.  Now I don't know if you've read any history,” (definition by romantic tradition) “but this whole thing is as simple as stating 'my mother is a woman'!” (definition by popular consensus) “When you go travelling, you fill in the nationality field with 'China' and not 'Hong Kong'” (definition by legal nationality).  At no point does the nebula of definitions attempt to be consistent with itself, with different facets thereof carted out when the situation calls for it --- its principal aim is to remind the audience that they are Chinese.  The Chinese nationalist-reminder thus selects its victims with utmost abandon, for anyone with the most tenuous claim to “Chinese”-ness, perhaps by some distant grand-grand-grand uncle who lived in a conquered province under the (Mongolian-ruled) Qing Dynasty, could still be lassoed in to become just as “Chinese” as the bloodline heir to Old Confucius by the interwoven mess that is “Chinese national identity”.  And once that association is mentioned, the Chinese nationalist-reminder grows full-blown into the Chinese nationalist-curse, for it is within that narrative that any such identified “Chinese” are duty-bound to follow the leadership of the current “Chinese” regime, i.e. the PRC.  That these wildly varying and at times self-conflicting definitions could be played out at will to form an unassailable and messy whole is precisely how the call to Chinese nationalism is no more than a utilitarian chain whose purpose isn't to define a nation, or a nation's people, but to subjugate whatever audience it may lay claim to.  Were this mess of what constitutes a Chinese to be taken seriously, the identity of a “Chinese” would be most schizophrenic indeed.

One could likewise observe how the idea of a Han Chinese identity would fall apart pretty quickly on both ethnic and civic/cultural grounds once you factor in the observable effects of geography on the centuries of interbreeding (and lack thereof), both in blood and language, so much so that the language of the Cantonese is mutually unintelligible with the tongue of the Fujianese, that the funeral customs of Sichuan would look alien to the most accepting Shanghainese, and that the adage of “All Chinese look alike” is indeed a racist generalisation, for no inhabitant of this East Asian land would be unable to differentiate the telling physical differences between a Beijingese and a Hongkonger.  All these, of course, could be wily dismissed by those who (mis-)follow the school of thought where nations are imagined, and thus as long as the ruling Beijing and the majority of her followers imagine Hongkongers to be part of this “Chinese” whole, it is democratically just to accept that, yes, Hongkongers are “Chinese”, too.  All the more lamentable is the reality, in fact, when it is not only the Beijingese, but also a substantial amount of Hongkongers, who buy into this line of thought.

“Chinese nationalism” fails to be nationalism at all

What, then, could the Hong Kong Nationalists offer as a rebuttal?  The answer is simple: Chinese nationalism fails as nationalism.  That is to say, Chinese nationalism is not nationalism.  To support this argument one might need to devote several lifetimes' work into defining “what is nationalism” academically, which is commendable as an intellectual pursuit on its own, but infinitely unhelpful to the situation that Hongkongers are facing with our limited time, quickly running out.  Thus sweeping away all academic considerations on the clinical definitions of nationalism and focusing on the most important thing at hand --- the people of the nation --- one arrives at a common thread that permeates through all definitions: that nationalism is a supreme uniting force for the people, by the people, of the people.  It is a noble call to arms, a sense of camaraderie with those with whom you know you share a common ground.  It is a promise that someone you might not know personally has your back covered on matters important.  And most importantly, it is an exclusive force, for it defines clearly its criteria for inclusion, and from it do the nationals derive their shared pride --- whether in culture, in blood, or in myth.

Let us ask, then, what are the effects of the question, “Are you not Chinese?” upon the accused Hongkongers.  It is not a noble call, but a condescending subjugation of the Hongkonger identity.  It is not a celebration of camaraderie, but a shaming order for compliance and obedience.  It is not a recognition for common ground, but an admission of a lack thereof.  It is not a promise of support, but a threat of public guilt.  And most damningly, it does not evoke pride in Hongkongers, but instead demands submission and self-deletion.  The question is not so much as a reminder of Sinic brotherhood but a memo on Sinic domination.  To tell a Hongkonger he or she is Chinese is anything but a nationalistic call --- Chinese imperialism is alive and well, and no matter of rebranding can the leopard change its spots, oppressive blemishes and all.

20160601

End of "Overseas Chinese Patriotism" Marks Beginning of HK's Nation Awareness

End of "Overseas Chinese Patriotism" Marks Beginning of Hong Kong's Nation Awareness
The Epochal Significance of "Putting a Stop On Commemorating Tian'anmen Massacre"
Translated by Chen-t'ang 鎮棠, written by Tony Chui
Original: http://polymerhk.com/articles/2016/05/31/31754/ 
A newspaper headline on Hongkongers supporting students in Beijing, not to mention CY Leung's support at that time.
Since 2013, people might oppose the vigil in Victoria Park held by the Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements in China (the Alliance), but people do not reject commemorating the Tian'anmen Massacre itself. Many other commemoration activities of the Massacre turned out. However, this year, there are people (who are not pro-Beijing) to propose not to commemorate the Massacre in the future. Recently, Althea Suen, the president of the HKUSU, said "I think that within one or two years, commemorating the Massacre should no longer be on the agenda of the tertiary education sector, and a period should be put there." She added that "Commemoration of the Massacre based on the 'compatriot' identity should be ended. " At the same time, Samuel Lai, Acting Chairperson at Current Affairs Committee, HKUSU Council, said, "We should put an end to the commemoration of the Massacre based on patriotism".

The "wind" that blows off the Massacre commemoration candles might not be Beijing, be it vindication or further suppression, but Hong Kong's nation awareness, or more commonly known as "localism" . In fact, in 2013, regarding whether to attend the vigil in Victoria Park, columnist Joseph Lian already said, "The year Hong Kong does not condemn the Massacre in Victoria Park, the year Hong Kong independence is full-fledged to made its existence among us [ref John 1:14]".

Where Does the Tradition of Massacre Commemoration Come From?
Before asking whether Hongkongers should continue to commemorate the Massacre, we should first ask: why are there so many people commemorating the Massacre every year? Why the number of attendants is far less in commemoration vigils in Taiwan or Macau?

Some commentators said the commemoration of the Massacre in Hong Kong is not only out of patriotism, but also out of the pursuit after democracy, freedom and human rights, as well as the persistence to justice. This is untenable: there are so many tragedies in the world, and no society will commemorate all. Choosing which tragedy to commemorate depends on whether such tragedies are significant to that society. Therefore, human rights or justice cannot be the only force for the community to commemorate an incident for such a long time so regularly, instead, specific identity and community ties can.


Why would Hongkongers supported the Beijing students' protest in 1989? Why were Hongkongers having strong reactions to the Massacre? Why were there so many large scale of commemoration vigil every year? I would like to cite an analysis written by Leung Man-tao back in 2005:

"During April to June 1989, the unprecedented passion of the Hong Kong society is related to the identity as Chinese. Songs prevalent at that time include "Be a Brave Chinese", "I am Chinese", "Descendants of Dragon" and so on [...] After two decades of growth and separation to the Mainland's political and social environment, Hong Kong and its people have a chance to know more about its motherland and to "re-identify" themselves as Chinese. Many Hongkongers might not know exactly what the Beijing students demand, but they will spend lots of time to listen to the radio and watch the TV, to discuss the trend of the movement — the way to connect China and themselves, who were in a British colony. Therefore, compared to the 1 July protest, the 1989 protest is actually an unprecedented patriotic movement.
Leung also pointed out the support of Beijing students from Hongkongers were not only because of "the patriotic mentality of overseas Chinese", but also because Hongkongers hoped that the success of China's democratic movement can ensure the freedom and autonomy of Hong Kong, and preventing Hong Kong from the "death of Hong Kong" by 1997.

"Lots of commentators have pointed out that the [then] passion of Hongkongers was built on the envisage of the future. Many Hongkongers believed that if China has started a political reform towards democracy before 1997, then the handover in 1997 would not be that fearful [...] Democracy and patriotism have since entwined with each other, thus becoming the largest momentum of the Alliance, and the political capital and background of pan-democrats, including the Democratic Party."
The ending was universally known - the Tian'anmen Massacre. Rich Hongkongers applied for emigration; poor ones demanded to accelerate the progress of Hong Kong's democracy, and hoped for an unchanged situation after 1997 with a democratic system. But at that point, many Hongkongers still see themselves as Chinese. After the 1991 Eastern China flood, Hongkongers donated HK$700 million;  in 1992 Barcelona Olympics, many Hongkongers supported Team China; in 1996, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands conflicts have caused many people to join protests organised by the Action Committee for Defending the Diaoyu Islands (ACDDI, and the movement is known as "Baodiao" movement), and make donations for them to go to the Islands. After David Chan Yuk-cheung, a prominent Baodiao activist who drowned around the seas of Diaoyu Islands, Democratic Party and DAB had an unprecedented joint candlelight vigil in the Victoria Park to commemorate this "Baodiao hero". Supporting the Beijing students' movements and commemorating the Massacre are ordinary examples of the "patriotic overseas Chinese mentality" by Hongkongers at that time — to be safe patriots outside China.

The Massacre Enlightens Hongkongers Politically, But Has Become Balls and Chains?
It is well known that the Massacre is the incident that enlightens many Hongkongers politically. Many Hongkongers participating in democratic movements started to care about the politics of Hong Kong and China, and started various confrontations. League of Social Democrats and ACDDI member Bull Tsang Kin-shing is one example.

When compared to recent "localist" movements, these democratic movements do not deny "Hong Kong is part of China" and "Hongkongers are Chinese", and based on these two principles, the activists supported democracy, human rights and autonomy for Hong Kong. The protest against brainwashing National Education in 2012 did not deny such principles (even they were led by new generation), and largely supported "loving China, but not loving the Party" — or "Hong Kong style patriotism". For the deliberation of the "Occupy Central with Love and Peace" and "I want universal suffrage" movement during 2013 to 27 September 2014, the main principle is not to challenge "Hong Kong is part of China". This explains why there were many youngsters who were not yet born during the Massacre went to Victoria Park Vigil during 2011-2014, and sung patriotic songs. This is because it was a stance against HKSARG and CCP. However, these democratic movements declined after the tearing gas shot on 28 September 2014.

Rumours of "cops have fired" or "PLA has came out of the barracks"" spreaded on the Internet on 28 September. Many people remembered the Massacre. In order to avoid the same tragedy in Hong Kong, they asked protesters to leave as soon as possible. On 1 October, students have formed a chain from letting other protesters barging the PRC national day flag-raising ceremony in Golden Bauhinia Square. It was said that the reason is not to give excuses for Beijing to launch a carnage. Such thoughts and moves are definitely related to the Massacre. Thus, we can say the memory of the Massacre has deterred some protesters from escalating their actions.

Whether the memory of the Massacre is a force or a hindrance to the post-Umbrella confrontation is a food for thought for you.

HK Alliance + Pan-dems = Kuomintang?; "Construct a Democratic China"="Three Principles of the People Unites China"?

The trend of Hong Kong independence has arised. Some pro-Beijing politicians said pan-democratic parties can be the "loyal opposition camp" that supports One Country, Two Systems. Then it is unavoidable to compare the development of Taiwan independence movement and Hong Kong in recent years.

If one looks at the political propaganda of KMT in the early 1980s, one can easily find out KMT often condemned Taiwan independence groups having close connections with CCP. After KMT has moved to Taiwan, they knew it was impossible to "counter-attack mainland China". After Chiang Kai-shek passed away, Chiang Ching-kuo even used "Three Principles of the People Unites China" to replace the slogan of "counter-attack mainland China". Li Teng-hui became the president in 1990s, and thus some old Kuomingtang members withdrew from KMT and formed New Party, in pursuit of ultimate unification. This move was welcomed by Beijing. In 2000, when Democratic Progressive Party started ruling Taiwan for the first time, KMT and CCP have become closer as they are against Taiwan independence. If Beijing sees the archenemy in Hong Kong as the "Hong Kong separatists", then it is important to look at whether CCP treats pan-dems in the way that CCP treats KMT as the allies of anti-secession, or Tongzhan subjects.

Chip Tsao and Ivan Choy have pointed out that what Beijing fears most is not lots of participants in the Victoria Park vigil, but rather, no participants at all. If so, commemorating the Massacre in Hong Kong may cause Beijing to be "unhappy" on the surface, but deep inside, CCP welcomes such commemoration because this is what Christopher Chung said, "being local without separation". In 1958, CCP attacked Quemoy and Matsu, the two islands held by KMT which are close to mainland China. On the surface, CCP attacked with strong weapons, and the US even asked Chiang to give up these two islands, but Chiang did not do so. CCP did not want KMT to leave, because if they did, the ties between Taiwan and mainland China will be completely severed, and the situation of Two Chinas will be formed. This is what Mao and Chiang opposed, but the US supported (Taylor, 2009). Commemoration of the Massacre might be the main emotional tie between mainland China and Hong Kong, and be treated as a tool to suppress separatism. Few years ago KMT veterans went to mainland China, and said "KMT army or PLA are all Chinese army!" By the same token, Hong Kong Alliance in Support of Patriotic Democratic Movements of China and Communist Party of China also contain the word China.

Conclusion: Re-consider About the HK-China Relationship, and One Would Doubt the Necessity to Commemorate the Massacre
After the handover in 1997, Hongkongers are no longer "overseas Chinese" under the British rule, but Chinese nationals under the (though indirect) rule of PRC. In face of Beijing's rule with HK-China integration, the difference between Hong Kong and China gradually diminishes. Hong Kong is no longer a British overseas territory with political stability with nice livelihood. Members of public having confrontation with the police force on the street is no longer something afar like the Tian'anmen Massacre, but rather places that one can easily access to. It is not only normal but also mature and responsible for Hongkongers, especially younger ones, to re-consider the Hong Kong-China relationship. Other Hongkongers are irrational and irresponsible to backfire them without rhyme or reason — especially those Hongkongers who can emigrate whenever they want and be a "patriotic Chinese"in the West.



Reference:
Jay Taylor (2009): The Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-shek and the Struggle for Modern China / End of IV 2 - Managing the Protector